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Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers
16-1276
Ruling Below: Somers v. Digital Realty Trust Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (C.A.9 (Cal.), 2017)
Former employee brought action against employer for violation of whistleblower protection
provision of Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, Edward M. Chen, J., denied employer's
motion to dismiss and certified interlocutory appeal. Employer appealed. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Question Presented: Whether the anti-retaliation provision for “whistleblowers” in the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 extends to individuals who have
not reported alleged misconduct to the Securities and Exchange Commission and thus fall
outside the act’s definition of “whistleblower.”

Paul SOMERS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DIGITAL REALTY TRUST INC., a Maryland corporation; Ellen Jacobs, DefendantsAppellants.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on March 8, 2017
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). See 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). If so, it would exclude
those, like the plaintiff in this case, who were
fired after making internal disclosures of
alleged unlawful activity.

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
INTRODUCTION
This appeal presents an issue of securities law
that has divided the federal district and circuit
courts. It results from a last-minute addition
to the anti-retaliation protections of the
Dodd-Frank Act (“DFA”) to extend
protection to those who make disclosures
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other
laws, rules, and regulations. 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A)(iii). The underlying issue is
whether, in using the term “whistleblower,”
Congress intended to limit protections to
those who come within DFA's formal
definition, which would include only those
who disclose information to the Securities

The Fifth Circuit was the first to weigh in on
the question and strictly applied DFA's
definition of “whistleblower” to the *1047
later anti-retaliation provision, so as to
require dismissal of the plaintiff's action in
that case because he did not make his
disclosures to the SEC. Asadi v. G.E. Energy
(USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir.
2013). It therefore rejected the SEC's
regulation adopting a contrary interpretation.
Id. at 630.
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The Second Circuit, viewing the statute itself
as ambiguous, applied Chevron deference to
the
SEC's
regulation.
Berman
v.
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d
Cir. 2015). That regulation, in effect,
interprets the provision to extend protections
to all those who make disclosures of
suspected violations, whether the disclosures
are made internally or to the SEC. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.21F-2.

Somers subsequently sued Digital Realty,
alleging violations of various state and
federal laws, including Section 21F of the
Exchange Act. That section, entitled
“Securities Whistleblower Incentives and
Protection,” includes the anti-retaliation
protections created by DFA. Digital Realty
sought to dismiss the DFA claim on the
ground that, because Somers only reported
the possible violations internally and not to
the SEC, he was not a “whistleblower”
entitled to DFA's protections.

The district court in this case followed the
Second
Circuit's
approach,
denied
Defendant's motion to dismiss, and certified
an interlocutory appeal. We agree with the
district court that the regulation is consistent
with Congress's overall purpose to protect
those who report violations internally as well
as those who report to the government. This
intent is reflected in the language of the
specific statutory subdivision in question,
which explicitly references internal reporting
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange
Act”). In view of that language, and the
overall operation of the statute, we conclude
that the SEC regulation correctly reflects
congressional intent to provide protection for
those who make internal disclosures as well
as to those who make disclosures to the SEC.
We therefore affirm.

The district court, in a published opinion,
denied Digital Realty's motion to dismiss the
DFA claim. The court conducted an
extensive analysis of the statutory text, DFA's
legislative history, and the procedural and
practical implications of harmonizing the
narrow definition of “whistleblower” with
the broad protections of the anti-retaliation
provision. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr. Inc., 119
F.Supp.3d 1088, 1100–05 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
The court observed that “[a]t bottom, it is
difficult to find a clear and simple way to read
the statutory provisions of Section 21F in
perfect harmony with one another.” Id. at
1104. Having analyzed the tension between
the definition and anti-retaliation provisions,
the district court deferred to the SEC's
interpretation that individuals who report
internally only are nonetheless protected
from retaliation under DFA. Id. at 1106. The
district court certified the DFA question for
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b), id. at 1108, and we subsequently
granted Digital Realty's Petition for
Permission to Appeal.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-Appellee, Paul Somers, was
employed as a Vice President by DefendantAppellant, Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (“Digital
Realty”), from 2010 to 2014. According to
Somers's complaint in district court, he made
several reports to senior management
regarding possible securities law violations
by the company, soon after which the
company fired him. Somers was not able to
report his concerns to the SEC before Digital
Realty terminated his employment.

DISCUSSION
The case must be seen against the
background of twenty-first century statutes to
curb securities abuses. Congress enacted the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, following a
major financial scandal. Its purpose was “[t]o
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safeguard investors in public companies and
restore trust in the financial markets
following
the
collapse
of
Enron
Corporation.” Lawson v. FMR LLC, –––
U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1158, 1161, 188
L.Ed.2d 158 (2014). As a key part of its
safeguards, Sarbanes-Oxley requires internal
reporting by lawyers working for public
companies. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245. This is in
addition to internal reporting by auditors,
which was already mandated by the
Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b).
Further, Sarbanes-Oxley requires that
companies maintain internal compliance
systems that include procedures for
employees to anonymously report concerns
about accounting or auditing matters. See 15
U.S.C. § 78-j-1(m)(4), 7262. It also provides
protections
to
these
and
other
“whistleblower” employees in the event that
companies retaliate against them. 18 U.S.C. §
1514A(a). Sarbanes-Oxley expressly protects
those who lawfully provide information to
federal agencies, Congress, or “a person with
supervisory authority over the employee.” Id.
Like Sarbanes-Oxley, DFA was passed in the
wake of a financial scandal—the subprime
mortgage bubble and subsequent market
collapse of 2008. See Samuel C. Leifer, Note,
Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the
Dodd-Frank Act, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 121,
129–30 (2014) (discussing the mortgage
crisis and Congress's response). In enacting
DFA, Congress said the main purposes
included “promot[ing] the financial stability
of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the
financial
system”
and
“protect[ing]
consumers from abusive financial services
practices.” Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376, 1376 (2010). DFA provided new
incentives and employment protections for
whistleblowers by adding Section 21F to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section
21F defines a whistleblower as, “any
individual who provides, or 2 or more

individuals acting jointly who provide,
information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the Commission, in a
manner established, by rule or regulation, by
the Commission.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
This definition thus describes only those who
report information to the SEC.
The anti-retaliation provision in question in
this case is found in a later subsection of
Section 21F. It provides broad protections
and states:
No employer may discharge, demote,
suspend, threaten, harass, directly or
indirectly, or in any other manner
discriminate against, a whistleblower in the
terms and conditions of employment because
of any lawful act done by the
whistleblower—
(i) in providing information to the
Commission in accordance with this section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in
any investigation or judicial or administrative
action of the Commission based upon or
related to such information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this chapter,
including section 78j-1(m) of this title,
section 1513(e) of Title 18, and any other
law, rule, or regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). The issue in this
case concerns subdivision (iii), which gives
whistleblower protection to all those who
make any required or protected disclosure
under Sarbanes-Oxley and all other relevant
laws.
Subdivision (iii) was added after the bill went
through Committee. There is no legislative
history explaining its purpose, but its
language illuminates congressional intent. By
broadly incorporating, through subdivision
(iii),
Sarbanes-Oxley's
disclosure
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requirements
and
protections,
DFA
necessarily bars retaliation against an
employee of a public company who reports
violations to the boss, i.e., one who
“provide[s] information” regarding a
securities law violation to “a person with
supervisory authority over the employee.” 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(a). Provisions of SarbanesOxley and the Exchange Act mandate
internal reporting before external reporting.
Auditors, for example, must “as soon as
practicable, inform the appropriate level of
management” of illegal acts, and only after
such internal reporting may auditors bring
their concerns to the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78j1(b). Leaving employees without protection
for that required preliminary step would
result in early retaliation before the
information could reach the regulators. As
the Second Circuit noted, “[I]f subdivision
(iii) requires reporting to the [SEC], its
express cross-reference to the provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley would afford an auditor
almost no Dodd-Frank protection for
retaliation because the auditor must await a
company response to internal reporting
before reporting to the Commission, and any
retaliation would almost always precede
Commission reporting.” Berman, 801 F.3d at
151. Sarbanes-Oxley likewise requires
lawyers to report internally, 15 U.S.C. §
7245, and the SEC's Standards of
Professional Conduct set forth only limited
instances in which an attorney may reveal
client confidences to the SEC, 17 C.F.R. §
205.3(d)(2). The attorney would be left with
little DFA protection.

(2015). The use of a term in one part of a
statute “may mean [a] different thing[ ]” in a
different part, depending on context. See id.
at 2493 n.3. This is true even where, as here,
the statute includes a definitional provision:
“[Statutory d]efinitions are, after all, just one
indication of meaning—a very strong
indication, to be sure, but nonetheless one
that can be contradicted by other
indications.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 228 (2012). DFA's antiretaliation provision unambiguously and
expressly protects from retaliation all those
who report to the SEC and who report
internally. See King, 135 S.Ct. at 2493 n.3.
Its terms should be enforced.
Reading the use of the word “whistleblower”
in the anti-retaliation provision to incorporate
the earlier, narrow definition would make
little practical sense and undercut
congressional intent. As the Second Circuit
pointed out, subdivision (iii) would be
narrowed to the point of absurdity; the only
class of employees protected would be those
who had reported possible securities
violations both internally and to the SEC,
when the employer—unaware of the report to
the SEC—fires the employee solely on the
basis of the employee's internal report. See
Berman, 801 F.3d at 151–52. This reading is
illogical. Employees are not likely to report
in both ways, but are far more likely to
choose reporting either to the SEC or
reporting internally. See id. Reporting to the
SEC brings a higher likelihood of a problem
being addressed, along *1050 with an
increased risk of employer retaliation,
whereas internal reporting may be less
efficient but safer. Id. As we have seen,
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Exchange Act
prohibit potential whistleblowers—auditors
and lawyers—from reporting to the SEC until
after they have reported internally. Id. at 152–
53. The anti-retaliation provision would do

That DFA's definitional provision describes
“whistleblowers” as employees who report
“to the Commission” thus should not be
dispositive of the scope of DFA's later antiretaliation provision. Terms can have
different operative consequences in different
contexts. See King v. Burwell, –––U.S. ––––
, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2489, 192 L.Ed.2d 483
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nothing to protect these employees from
immediate retaliation in response to their
initial internal report. A strict application of
DFA's definition of whistleblower would, in
effect, all but read subdivision (iii) out of the
statute. We should try to give effect to all
statutory language. See Duncan v. Walker,
533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150
L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (rejecting a statutory
construction that would render a term
“insignificant, if not wholly superfluous”);
see also Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Pritzker, 828 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir.
2016).

file an action in federal court, pursuant to
DFA's enforcement scheme. See 15 U.S.C. §
78u-6(h)(1)(B). Second, while DFA provides
for awards of double back pay, 15 U.S.C. §
78u-6(h)(1)(C), Sarbanes-Oxley allows
employees to recover “all relief necessary to
make the employee whole,” including
compensation for special damages, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(c). An employee who has suffered
more substantial emotional injury than
financial harm would likely be better off with
Sarbanes-Oxley's allowance for special
damages. See Jones v. SouthPeak Interactive
Corp., 777 F.3d 658, 672 (4th Cir. 2015)
(joining the Fifth and Tenth Circuits in
concluding that emotional distress damages
are available under Sarbanes-Oxley as
“special damages”). DFA's protection for
internal reporting therefore does not render
Sarbanes-Oxley's
enforcement
scheme
superfluous. The statutes provide alternative
enforcement mechanisms.

We recognize there is intercircuit
disagreement. The Second Circuit in Berman
disagreed with the Fifth Circuit, which had
earlier applied the formal definition of
whistleblower to limit the scope of the antiretaliation provision. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630.
The Asadi decision reasoned that if DFA
protected the same conduct that SarbanesOxley did, then the Sarbanes-Oxley
enforcement scheme would be rendered moot
or superfluous, on the theory that no one
would use it. See id. at 628–29. The Fifth
Circuit pointed out that Sarbanes-Oxley lacks
DFA's double damage provision, has a
shorter statute of limitations, and has more
extensive administrative requirements. Id.
But as the SEC has pointed out in its amicus
brief in this case, DFA's enforcement scheme
is not more protective in all situations and
would not swallow Sarbanes-Oxley because
Sarbanes-Oxley offers a different process
from DFA. Sarbanes-Oxley may be more
attractive to the whistleblowing employee in
at least two important ways. First, SarbanesOxley provides for adjudication through
administrative review, with the Department
of Labor taking responsibility for asserting
the claim on the whistleblower's behalf. 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2). This procedure would
likely be significantly less costly and
stressful for whistleblowers than having to

For all these reasons, we conclude that
subdivision (iii) of section 21F should be read
to provide protections to those who report
internally as well as to those who report to the
SEC. We also agree with the Second Circuit
that, even if the use of the word
“whistleblower” in the anti-retaliation
provision creates uncertainty because of the
earlier narrow definition of the term, the
agency responsible for enforcing the
securities laws has resolved any ambiguity
and its regulation is entitled to deference. In
2011, the SEC issued Exchange Act Rule
21F-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2, pursuant to its
rule-making authority under 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(j). The SEC's rule *1051 in our view
accurately reflects Congress's intent to
provide broad whistleblower protections
under DFA. The Rule says that anyone who
does any of the things described in
subdivisions (i), (ii), and (iii) of the antiretaliation provision is entitled to protection,
including those who make internal
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disclosures under Sarbanes-Oxley. They are
all whistleblowers. The Rule is quite direct:
“For purposes of the anti-retaliation
protections afforded by Section 21F(h)(1) of
the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)),
you are a whistleblower if: ... [y]ou provide
that information in a manner described in [the
anti-retaliation provision] of the Exchange
Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)).” 17 C.F.R. §
240.21F-2.
The
regulation
accurately
reflects
congressional intent that DFA protect
employees whether they blow the whistle
internally, as in many instances, or they
report directly to the SEC. The district court
correctly so recognized.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
***
OWENS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I agree with the Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E.
Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621
(5th Cir. 2013), and Judge Jacobs' dissent in
Berman v. Neo @Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145,
155–60 (2d Cir. 2015), and therefore
respectfully dissent. Both the majority here
and the Second Circuit in Berman rely in part
on King v. Burwell, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct.
2480, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015), to read the
relevant statutes in favor of the government's
position. In my view, we should quarantine
King and its potentially dangerous
shapeshifting nature to the specific facts of
that case to avoid jurisprudential disruption
on a cellular level. Cf. John Carpenter's The
Thing (Universal Pictures 1982).
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“U.S. high court to review scope of Dodd-Frank whistleblower
protections”
Reuters
Sarah N. Lynch
June 26, 2017

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Monday
to consider whether corporate insiders who
blow the whistle on their employers are
shielded from retaliation if they only report
alleged misconduct internally rather than to
the government's Securities and Exchange
Commission.

They also give the SEC the power to offer
monetary awards to whistleblowers whose
tips lead to successful enforcement actions.
Digital Realty Trust argues the antiretaliation protections do not apply to people
who fail to report their allegations to the SEC
because the law defines a whistleblower as a
person who reports possible securities
violations to the SEC.

The justices will hear Digital Realty Trust
Inc's appeal of a lower court ruling in favor
of Paul Somers, an executive fired by the San
Francisco-based
company
after
he
complained internally about alleged
misconduct by his supervisor but never
reported the matter to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

If the Supreme Court ultimately sides with
the company, then it would force corporate
whistleblowers to report wrongdoing to the
SEC in order to be protected from retaliation.
Such a result could deter people from
reporting misconduct internally first, said
Jordan Thomas, a partner at Labaton
Sucharow
who
represents
SEC
whistleblowers.

The case hinges on the SEC's whistleblower
protection rules required by the 2010 DoddFrank Wall Street reform law.
The court agreed to take up the case on the
last day of a nine-month session. The court
will hear the case during the next term that
starts in October.

"I think both corporate whistleblowers and
corporations should hope that the Supreme
Court finds that internal reporting is
sufficient to have the anti-retaliation
protections because if not, sophisticated
corporate whistleblowers will bypass internal
reporting systems and report directly to the
SEC," he said.

The SEC rules, adopted in 2011, prohibit
corporate employers from retaliating in any
way against whistleblowers who try to report
allegations of securities law violations.
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Digital Realty Trust, a real estate investment
trust company, became entangled in the
dispute over whistleblower protection after it
fired Somers, its former vice president of
portfolio management.
Somers had complained internally that his
supervisor had eliminated some internal
controls and hid major cost overruns on a
project in Hong Kong.
After he was fired, he sued the company in
November 2014, saying he was protected
from retaliation as a whistleblower under the
Dodd-Frank law.
The company tried unsuccessfully to quash
his claim in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California.
While the case was on appeal before the 9th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, a divided 2nd
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals panel ruled in
a similar case that people who only report
misconduct internally are whistleblowers
who merit protection from retaliation.
The 9th Circuit later affirmed the California
finding, with the SEC also filing a friend of
the court brief in the case and participating in
oral arguments in support of Somers.
Both the 2nd and 9th Circuit opinions are at
odds with the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, which previously held that
whistleblowers must report to the SEC in
order to receive protective status.
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“The Bumpy Road To Protection For Internal Whistleblowers”
Law360
Ryan S. Hedges, Brooke E. Conner
March 27, 2017

Two recent court decisions are just the latest
developments in the bumpy road to
protection
for
internal
corporate
whistleblowers, a prominent issue that has
sparked outspoken advocacy from the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, and
may be increasingly likely to draw the U.S.
Supreme Court’s attention. On March 8,
2017, a split Ninth Circuit panel ruled in
favor of extending Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation protections to whistleblowers who
choose to report suspected securities law
violations internally to their employers, but
who do not report directly to the SEC. On
March 20, 2017, the Supreme Court declined
to review a case out of the Sixth Circuit in
which the district court had dismissed the
case and ruled that Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower protections applied only to
those who report to the SEC. In that case, the
Sixth Circuit had affirmed on other grounds,
so the Dodd-Frank issue was not squarely in
play on certiorari. But, in light of the
widening circuit split on the issue, it seems
likely that the Supreme Court’s recent denial
of certiorari will not be its final say on the
topic.

internally within a company but not to the
SEC. Section 21F(a)(6) of Dodd-Frank
defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual
who provides ... information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the
Commission.” However, Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation provisions, specifically Section
21F(h)(1)(A)(iii), prohibit retaliation against
“whistleblowers” who make disclosures that
are required or protected under the SarbanesOxley Act, the Securities Exchange Act and
“any other law, rule or regulation subject to
the jurisdiction of the [SEC],” which, under
certain circumstances, would include only
internal reports. It is no surprise that the
arguably confusing statutory provisions have
caused the SEC to adopt rules clarifying its
position and have resulted in opposing
judicial opinions in multiple circuit courts.
The SEC’s Strong Record in Favor of
Broad Whistleblower Protection
The SEC’s position on the issue has been
well-documented through agency rulemaking, as well as in numerous amicus briefs
filed in federal cases across the country since
the implementation of Dodd-Frank. From a
policy perspective, the SEC believes that
internal company reporting by employees is
essential in order to deter, detect and halt
unlawful conduct that may harm investors.
To that end, the SEC views the Dodd-Frank

The crux of the legal debate centers on
whether the whistleblower protection
provision in Section 922 of Dodd-Frank
protects whistleblower reports that are made
93

the Whistleblower, reiterated the SEC’s
position that it is “committed to protecting
whistleblowers from retaliation and will
continue to file briefs as appropriate in
support of whistleblower protection.”
Moreover, in 2016 the SEC initiated its own
litigation
to
enforce
whistleblower
protection, bringing its first stand-alone
enforcement action against a company for
unlawful retaliation without an underlying
securities violation,[6] as well as
enforcement actions based solely on
restrictive language contained in companies’
standard separation agreements, and not
relating to the underlying allegations reported
by a whistleblower.[7]

anti-retaliation provisions as a welcome
supplement to the existing securities-law
enforcement regime because the provisions
encourage robust compliance programs and
internal investigations of whistleblower
reports.
Thus, the SEC has supported broad
whistleblower protection in the face of legal
challenges and has taken all steps available to
encourage
reporting
and
prohibit
retaliation.[1] In May 2011, the SEC issued
regulations
providing
that
internal
whistleblowers are protected from retaliation
under Dodd-Frank, even if they report only to
their employers and not to the SEC.[2] The
SEC accomplished this by promulgating two
separate
definitions
of
the
word
“whistleblower” — one that applies to
whistleblower awards and confidentiality
provisions and one that applies for purposes
of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation protections.
Just over four years later, in August 2015, the
SEC issued an “interpretive rule” reaffirming
its view that individuals who have not
reported to the SEC are protected from
retaliation by an employer.[3]

Under the SEC’s formal whistleblower
program, created as part of Dodd-Frank, an
individual who provides the SEC with
original information leading to an
enforcement action that results in over $1
million in monetary sanctions is eligible to
receive an award of 10 percent to 30 percent
of the amount collected. The whistleblower
program encourages internal reporting of
possible violations by offering additional
economic incentives to do so in the first
instance.[8] Based on the success of the
whistleblower program, the SEC has a vested
interest in expanding protections for those
individuals who choose to report possible
misconduct, whether they choose to do so
internally or directly to the SEC.[9]

The SEC has been very active in litigation
pertaining to this issue in federal district and
appellate courts across the country.[4] The
SEC’s amicus briefs filed in these cases have
asked courts to rely on the agency’s adopted
regulations prohibiting employers from
retaliating against “individuals who report to
persons or governmental authorities other
than the Commission,” including employees
who make “the disclosures that are required
or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”
or other securities laws.[5] In October 2016,
Jane Norberg, chief of the SEC’s Office of

On the other hand, many companies facing
legal action for alleged retaliation have
vehemently opposed the SEC’s position and
argued against extending whistleblower
protections to non-SEC reports, hoping to
eliminate a potential cause of action that
94

could be asserted by terminated employees.
In response to the SEC’s concerns,
companies have argued that Congress has
taken clear and effective action to address
potential abuse of whistleblowers through the
plain language of Dodd-Frank and SarbanesOxley. Thus, companies insist that
whistleblower qualification under DoddFrank requires more than merely performing
existing job duties, which for many
employees includes assessing compliance
with the law and reporting issues internally.
Companies may also have a valid interest in
protecting their right to make reasonable
employment decisions based on false reports
made in bad faith, or for legitimate alternative
business reasons, without fear of a retaliation
lawsuit.

who complained to both the SEC and his or
her employer, as such employee would
qualify as a “whistleblower” under the
statutory definition and therefore would be
entitled to protection from retaliation. The
Fifth Circuit pointed out that if a
whistleblower qualified for retaliation
protection under Dodd-Frank based on the
individual’s qualification as a whistleblower
under Sarbanes-Oxley, such a result would
effectively moot Sarbanes-Oxley’s distinct
protections.[12]
The Second Circuit rejected this analysis in
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC and found that
non-SEC reporting whistleblowers are
entitled to protection from employer
retaliation.[13] The court found DoddFrank’s
definition
of
whistleblower
inconsistent
with
its
anti-retaliation
provisions, and it therefore applied Chevron
deference to the SEC’s regulations
interpreting the statute.[14] The Second
Circuit noted that the Dodd-Frank antiretaliation provisions would be narrowed to
the point of absurdity if SEC reporting were
a requirement for protection. In such a
scenario, the only protected individuals
would be those who reported possible
securities violations both internally and to the
SEC and were then fired solely on the basis
of the internal report.[15] Despite the circuit
split caused by the Second Circuit’s opinion,
the defendants in Berman did not seek
Supreme Court review of the decision.

Federal Circuit Split — Conflicting
Interpretations
of
Whistleblower
Protection
The recent Ninth Circuit ruling (discussed
above and below) followed two prominent
conflicting decisions in other federal circuit
courts. In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) LLC,
the Fifth Circuit was the first to consider the
issue and held that whistleblowers who did
not report to the SEC had no claim for
retaliation against their employers under
Dodd-Frank.[10] The court chose to “start
and end [its] analysis with the text of the
relevant statute,” holding that the definition
of “whistleblower” must be applied
consistently throughout the statute, thereby
requiring whistleblowers to report to the SEC
in order to become eligible for anti-retaliation
protection.[11] The Fifth Circuit found that
the relevant statutory provisions were not
inconsistent when applied to an employee

Ninth Circuit’s Recent Ruling Widens the
Circuit Split
More recently, in Somers v. Digital Realty
Trust Inc., the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
district court ruling that a former employee
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was entitled to sue his former employer over
his termination after he reported suspected
securities law violations to his employer but
not to the SEC.[16] The Ninth Circuit panel
majority
found
that
Dodd-Frank
“unambiguously and expressly protects from
retaliation all those who report to the SEC
and who report internally,” and it reasoned
that requiring a whistleblower to have
reported to the SEC in order to benefit from
Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions
would unjustly limit the intended protections
for whistleblowers and would “make little
practical sense.”[17] The court expressed
concern that such a requirement may provide
an incentive for companies to immediately
terminate complaining employees in the
hopes that they have not yet shared their
concerns with the agency, thereby avoiding a
potential retaliation claim. The court
recognized that since certain of SarbanesOxley’s provisions require internal reporting
before external reporting for certain
individuals, failing to protect internal
reporters “would result in early retaliation
before the information could reach the
regulators.”[18] The court expressly agreed
with the Second Circuit’s reasoning in
Berman, including that the SEC’s regulations
are entitled to deference and that the SEC’s
position “correctly reflects congressional
intent to provide protection for those who
make internal disclosures as well as to those
who make disclosures to the SEC.”[19]

decision in King v. Burwell,[20] which found
that a defined statutory term could be
interpreted differently depending on the
context of different statutory sections.
The scope of Dodd-Frank whistleblower
protection has been presented in at least two
other courts of appeals. As discussed above,
the Supreme Court recently declined to
review the Verble case out of the Sixth
Circuit, which had sidestepped the issue by
finding that a potential whistleblower’s
claims were too vague.[21] The issue is also
presented for decision in a case currently
pending in the Third Circuit.[22]
Expanded Whistleblower Protection —
Ripe for Repeal or Reversal?
Given the present uncertainty in the law, it is
not readily apparent how the change in
administration may affect the SEC’s welldefined position on whistleblower protection,
if at all. The SEC may prefer the status quo,
since encouraging and protecting internal
reporters from retaliation may allow
companies to investigate issues internally and
potentially minimize SEC inquiries resulting
from whistleblower reports. On the other
hand, the anti-retaliation provisions may be
subject to scrutiny given that President
Donald J. Trump and congressional
Republicans have pledged to roll back many
Dodd-Frank regulations, although President
Trump’s nominee for SEC chair, Walter
“Jay” Clayton, revealed at his confirmation
hearing that he would have no immediate
plans to broadly attack Dodd-Frank’s
mandates if he is confirmed. In addition, the
new administration may prefer that antiretaliation provisions not be extended to
employees who do not report to the SEC if

The dissent simply stated that the statute’s
definition of whistleblower should be applied
consistently throughout the statute, in
accordance with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in
Asadi. The dissent also took issue with the
majority’s reliance on a 2015 Supreme Court
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that is viewed as imposing a greater burden
on employers.

deference to its own rule-making. Thus,
should the SEC choose to maintain the status
quo on the regulatory front, the Supreme
Court’s resolution of the circuit split may
result in a rollback of protections for nonSEC reporting whistleblowers nonetheless.

On
the
enforcement
front,
many
commentators have noted that SEC chair
nominee Clayton, a partner at a New York
law firm who has not held any government
position, may not be as aggressive as recent
former federal prosecutors who served as
chair, which could result in fewer
enforcement
actions
to
protect
whistleblowers. Others have been outspoken
in their criticism of the SEC’s current stance
— and of Dodd-Frank itself — including
Paul Atkins, a former SEC commissioner and
adviser to President Trump, who has argued
in favor of requiring whistleblowers to report
internally before going to the SEC. Exactly
how the new administration and SEC
leadership
will
view
Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower protections and the SEC’s
well-documented position on the issue
remains to be seen.

Even if the Supreme Court chooses to limit
Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions to
SEC reports, it is unclear how much
employers stand to gain. If an employee is
required to report to the SEC prior to
termination in order to later bring a retaliation
claim against an employer, companies may
face increased regulatory scrutiny as a result.
Additional
SEC
investigations
of
whistleblower reports may occur before
companies are able to fully investigate the
reported misconduct themselves. Moreover,
even if the whistleblowers do not report to the
SEC, employees who report internally could
continue to seek recourse from retaliation
under Sarbanes-Oxley. Employers will
continue to be obligated to investigate
whistleblower allegations and to provide an
independent basis for terminating any
whistleblowers, lest it appear to regulators
that steps were taken to conceal misconduct.
Under the circumstances, a potential lawsuit
by a former employee may not be the most
distressing of the risks facing companies that
receive a whistleblower complaint.

Irrespective of the possible legislative and
executive developments, it is likely that antiretaliation provisions will continue to face
significant scrutiny in the courts. If the issue
is squarely presented and the Supreme Court
weighs in on the circuit split, President
Trump’s selected Supreme Court nominee,
Judge Neil Gorsuch, could take part in
deciding the issue if he is confirmed. Given
his well-documented history as an originalist
and textualist, and as a skeptic of deference
to agencies, Judge Gorsuch, if confirmed,
may be inclined to follow the Fifth Circuit’s
approach in Asadi, strictly applying DoddFrank’s whistleblower definition rather than
looking to the SEC’s interpretation of the
provisions and its asserted entitlement to

No matter what happens, whistleblower
protection is not an issue employers can
afford to take lightly. Companies should not
discount the importance of effective
whistleblower reporting infrastructure and
anti-retaliation training. This is particularly
important in the Second Circuit and Ninth
Circuit, where employers are more likely to
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be sued by terminated employees who report
internally without going to the SEC.
Companies should continue to retain
experienced outside counsel to investigate
whistleblower claims as soon as a report is
received. Companies contemplating the
termination of an employee who may be
considered a whistleblower should involve
outside counsel in that process and should
work to ensure that any termination is welldocumented. If a company discovers that a
whistleblower claim has merit, it should
consult with outside counsel regarding how
best to remediate the misconduct and to
consider whether a self-report to the SEC is
warranted. In any event, however a
whistleblower chooses to report potential
misconduct, a company’s response may be
subject to scrutiny by the government or the
courts.
The opinions expressed are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the firm, its clients, or Portfolio
Media Inc., or any of its or their respective
affiliates. This article is for general
information purposes and is not intended to
be and should not be taken as legal advice.
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“Supreme Court To Consider The Scope Of Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Provisions”
Lexology
July 6, 2017

On June 26, 2017, the United States Supreme
Court granted the petition for certiorari of
Digital Realty Trust Inc. (“Digital Realty”) to
consider whether the anti-retaliation
provision for whistleblowers in the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)
extends to individuals who have not reported
alleged misconduct to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and thus
arguably fall outside Dodd-Frank’s definition
of a “whistleblower.” In March, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled, in a 2-1 decision, that the term
“whistleblower” extends protection to
employees making internal disclosures of
alleged unlawful activity, and does not limit
protection under Dodd-Frank to employees
reporting potential violations to the SEC. The
Ninth Circuit’s decision widened an existing
split between the Second and Fifth Circuits,
making the issue ripe for review.

employment. Following his firing, Somers
sued Digital Realty, alleging violations of
various state and federal laws, including
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), which contains
anti-retaliation provisions added by DoddFrank.
At the district court level, Digital Realty
moved to dismiss the retaliation claim on the
ground that Somers was not a
“whistleblower” entitled to Dodd-Frank’s
protections because he merely reported
possible violations internally and not to the
SEC. The district court denied Digital
Realty’s motion to dismiss holding that
individuals who report internally are
protected from retaliation under Dodd-Frank.
Digital Realty appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
II. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision
The Ninth Circuit panel began its discussion
by acknowledging the split between the
Second and Fifth Circuits. The Fifth Circuit
held in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.
that Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision
requires a whistleblower to make a report to
the SEC in order to be covered, rejecting the
SEC’s regulation adopting a contrary
interpretation. The Second Circuit held in
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC that the
provision extends protections to all those

I. Background
Respondent, Paul Somers, was employed by
Petitioner, Digital Realty, from 2010 to 2014.
During that time, Somers made reports to
senior management alleging federal
securities laws violations by Digital Realty.
Shortly after he raised these concerns
internally, and before he made any report to
the SEC, Digital Realty terminated Somers’
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subdivision (iii) – wherein whistleblower
protection extends to individuals who make
any “required or protected” disclosure under
SOX and all other relevant laws. Subdivision
(iii) was added after the bill went through
Committee, so there is no meaningful
legislative history on it.

who make disclosures of suspected
violations, whether the disclosures are made
internally or to the SEC.
Next, the court chronicled the contours of a
robust twenty-first century financial
regulatory framework it described as created
specifically to curb securities abuses. To
frame the case against this regulatory
backdrop, the court focused on provisions of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) including
internal reporting requirements for lawyers,
requirements for anonymous reporting
avenues within corporate compliance
regimes,
and
most
importantly,
whistleblower protections for employees.
The court acknowledged SOX’s express
protections of those who lawfully provide
information to federal agencies, Congress, or
“a person with supervisory authority over the
employee.” With respect to Dodd-Frank, the
court reasoned that, like SOX, the legislation
was passed in the wake of a financial scandal
with the primary aims of improving
accountability and transparency in the
financial system, and protecting consumers
from abusive financial practices.

Although legislative history is not helpful,
the Ninth Circuit found that the language of
subdivision (iii) “illuminates congressional
intent.” The Ninth Circuit found that, by
incorporating SOX’s disclosure requirements
and protections through subdivision (iii),
Congress meant for Dodd-Frank to bar
retaliation against an employee of a public
company who “provide[s] information . . . to
a person with supervisory authority over the
employee.” Citing a similar analysis from the
Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit drew
attention to the “absurdities” potentially
created by a different interpretation,
explaining that, “if subdivision (iii) requires
reporting to the [SEC], its express crossreference to the provisions of SarbanesOxley would afford an auditor almost no
Dodd-Frank protection for retaliation
because the auditor must await a company
response to internal reporting before
reporting to the [SEC], and any retaliation
would almost always precede [SEC]
reporting.” Even though Dodd-Frank’s
definition of “whistleblowers” is limited to
those persons who report to the SEC, the
Ninth Circuit posited that terms can have
different operative consequences in different
contexts, and therefore was comfortable
accepting that the term “may mean a different
thing in a different part, depending on
context.” The court stated that interpreting
the word “whistleblower” to incorporate the

As the court observed, Dodd-Frank created
incentives and protections for whistleblowers
by adding Section 21F to the Exchange Act.
Unlike SOX, however, Section 21F defines a
whistleblower as “any individual who
provides . . . information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the [SEC],
in a manner established, by rule or regulation,
by the [SEC].” On its face, this definition
describes a whistleblower as a person who
reports information directly to the SEC. The
issue in Somers arises out of a later
subsection of Section 21F – specifically
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not warrant further review because “the
circuit conflict is shallow and may ultimately
resolve itself.” Somers stated that “the SEC
did not participate in the Fifth Circuit (but did
in the [Second and Ninth Circuits]), so there
is no split at all in cases directly involving the
agency tasked with enforcing the statute.”
Additionally, he stated that there “is good
reason to believe the Fifth Circuit will
reconsider its position, especially if
additional circuits continue lining up against
it.” The Supreme Court granted Digital
Realty’s petition on June 26, 2017, and will
hear the case during the October term. A date
for oral argument has not been set.

earlier, narrower definition of the Exchange
Act would “make little practical sense” and
“undercut congressional intent.” Citing again
to the Second Circuit’s similar reasoning in
Berman, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a
strict application of Dodd-Frank’s definition
“would, in effect, all but read subdivision (iii)
out of the statute.”
Furthermore, unlike the Fifth Circuit in
Asadi, the court accorded deference to the
SEC rules adopted in 2011 that contain the
more
expansive
definition
of
“whistleblower” and found that those rules
reflected Congressional intent to provide
broad whistleblower protection. With those
bases, the court held that any employee who
takes any action described in subdivisions (i),
(ii), or (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision –
including, by reference to SOX, reporting “to
a person with supervisory authority over the
employee” – is entitled to protection as a
whistleblower. The Ninth Circuit concluded
that the interpretation accurately reflects
Congressional intent that Dodd-Frank
protects employees “whether they blow the
whistle internally” or report directly to the
SEC.
III. Digital Realty’s Petition to the
Supreme Court
On April 25, 2017, Digital Realty filed a
petition of certiorari for review of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision. Digital Realty argued that
the Supreme Court should grant the petition
because the “case presents a straightforward
conflict among the courts of appeals on an
important and recurring question involving
the interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act”
that “cries out for the Court’s review.” In his
response, Somers argued that the case does
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“9th Circ. Says Dodd-Frank Protects Non-SEC Whistleblowers”
Law360
Carmen Germaine
March 8, 2017

A divided Ninth Circuit panel ruled
Wednesday that the Dodd-Frank Act’s antiretaliation protections extend to
whistleblowers who haven’t reported to the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
widening a circuit split and affirming that a
former Digital Realty Trust Inc. employee
can sue over his termination.

little practical sense and undercut
congressional intent.”
“DFA’s anti-retaliation provision
unambiguously and expressly protects from
retaliation all those who report to the SEC
and who report internally,” Judge Mary M.
Schroeder wrote for the panel. “Its terms
should be enforced.”

The Ninth Circuit opinion widens a circuit
split between the Fifth Circuit and the
Second Circuit over how the Dodd-Frank
Act defines a "whistleblower." (AP)

Judge John B. Owens wrote a brief dissent
saying he would agree with the Fifth Circuit
that the anti-retaliation subdivision should
be read using the same definition of
whistleblower outlined earlier in the statute.

A split three-judge panel affirmed U.S.
District Judge Edward M. Chen’s decision
denying Digital Realty’s bid to dismiss
former Vice President of Portfolio
Management Paul Somers’ claims that the
technology-related real estate investment
trust discriminated against him for being
openly gay and then fired him in retaliation
for his complaints about a supervisor’s
actions.

The opinion widens a circuit split between
the Fifth Circuit, which held in 2013 in its
Asadi case that only those who report to the
SEC are whistleblowers, and the Second
Circuit, which ruled in 2015 that the
retaliation provision was ambiguous and that
courts must defer to the SEC’s guidance.
The Sixth Circuit considered similar issues
in an appeal brought by a former Morgan
Stanley employee but dodged the question
after ruling that his claims were too vague to
afford him whistleblower protections; the
employee has since filed a petition for U.S.
Supreme Court review. Meanwhile, the
Third Circuit is also weighing the issue in an
appeal brought by a former in-house tax
attorney for Vanguard Group Inc.

While the panel noted that an earlier section
of the Dodd-Frank Act defines a
“whistleblower” as someone who reports to
the SEC, the judges said using that
definition in the act’s later anti-retaliation
provisions and effectively limiting
protections to employees who have already
reported to the government would “make
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“This reading is illogical,” Judge Schroeder
wrote. “Employees are not likely to report in
both ways, but are far more likely to choose
reporting either to the SEC or reporting
internally.”

Somers brought his case in November 2014,
alleging that he was discriminated against as
an openly gay man while employed at
Digital Realty from July 2010 to April 2014,
despite successful performance, and
ultimately terminated based on “vague,
trivial and false allegations of misconduct”
after he complained to senior management
that a senior vice president had eliminated
some internal corporate controls in
violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Judge
Chen denied Digital Realty’s motion to
dismiss the suit in May 2015.

In so holding, the panel relied on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in King v.
Burwell, which upheld the Affordable Care
Act’s grant of tax credits to individuals in all
states after finding language defined one
way in another section of the statute could
be read to have a different meaning in the
challenged clause, depending on the context.

The anti-retaliation provision in question,
subdivision (iii) of Section 21F of DoddFrank, prohibits employers from discharging
or discriminating against a whistleblower
who makes disclosures that are required or
protected by Sarbanes-Oxley.

Judge Owens wrote a paragraph dissent
disagreeing with the majority’s reliance on
King v. Burwell.
“In my view, we should quarantine King and
its potentially dangerous shapeshifting
nature to the specific facts of that case to
avoid jurisprudential disruption on a cellular
level,” Judge Owens wrote, citing John
Carpenter’s 1982 film “The Thing.”

The Ninth Circuit noted that the provision
was added after Dodd-Frank had gone
through committee and has no legislative
history explaining its purpose. But the panel
said the incorporation of Sarbanes-Oxley’s
disclosure requirements made it clear that
the provision was intended to bar retaliation
against employees of public companies who
report violations “to the boss.”

Circuit Judges Mary M. Schroeder, John B.
Owens and Kim McLane Wardlaw sat on
the panel for the Ninth Circuit.
Representatives for Somers and Digital
Realty Trust did not immediately respond to
requests for comment.

Using the narrower definition of
whistleblower outlined earlier in DoddFrank would effectively narrow subdivision
(iii) “to the point of absurdity,” the panel
wrote, because under that reading the
provision would only protect employees
who have reported both internally and to the
SEC but are fired solely because of the
internal report.

Somers is represented by Stephen F. Henry.
Digital Realty Trust is represented by Brian
T. Ashe, Tamara H. Fisher, Kiran A. Seldon
and Kyle A. Petersen of Seyfarth Shaw LLP.
The SEC is represented by Stephen G.
Yoder, Anne K. Small, Sanket J. Bulsara,
Michael A. Conley and Thomas J. Karr.
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The case is Paul Somers v. Digital Realty
Trust Inc. et al., case number 15-17352, in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
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Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
16-476
Ruling Below: National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d
389, 391 (C.A.3 (N.J.), 2016)
Professional and amateur sports leagues brought action to enjoin New Jersey from giving effect
to law partially repealing state's prohibitions against sports wagering. The United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, Michael A. Shipp, J., finding that state's law violated
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), entered summary judgment in
leagues' favor and issued permanent injunction. State appealed. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, Rendell, Circuit Judge, affirmed.
Question Presented: Whether a federal statute that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law
prohibitions on private conduct impermissibly commandeers the regulatory power of states in
contravention of New York v. United States.

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated assoc
iation; National Basketball Association, a joint venture; National Football League, an
unincorporated association; National Hockey League, an unincorporated association;
Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, an unincorporated association doing business as
Major League Baseball
v.
GOVERNOR OF the State of NEW JERSEY; David L. Rebuck, Director of the New
Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement and Assistant Attorney General of the State of
New Jersey; Frank Zanzuccki, Executive Director of the New Jersey Racing Commission;
New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen's Association, Inc; New Jersey Sports & Exposition
Authority
Stephen M. Sweeney, President of the New Jersey Senate; Vincent Prieto, Speaker of the
New Jersey General Assembly (Intervenors in District Court), Appellants in 14-4568
Governor of New Jersey; David L. Rebuck; Frank Zanzuccki, Appellants in 14-4546
New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen's Association, Inc., Appellant in 14-4569
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Decided on August 9, 2016
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
gambling (the “2014 Law”), violates federal
law. The District Court held that the 2014
Law violates the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”). A panel of
this Court affirmed this ruling in a divided
opinion which was subsequently vacated

RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
The issue presented before the en banc court
is whether SB 2460, which the New Jersey
Legislature enacted in 2014 to partially
repeal certain prohibitions on sports
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upon the grant of the Petition for Rehearing
en banc. We now hold that the District Court
correctly ruled that because PASPA, by its
terms, prohibits states from authorizing by
law sports gambling, and because the 2014
Law does exactly that, the 2014 Law violates
federal law. We also hold that we correctly
ruled in Christie I that PASPA does not
commandeer the states in a way that runs
afoul of the Constitution.

enactment. New Jersey did not do so, and
thus the PASPA exception expired. Notably,
sports gambling was prohibited in New
Jersey for many years by statute and by the
New Jersey Constitution. In 2010, however,
the New Jersey Legislature held public
hearings on the advisability of allowing
sports gambling. These hearings included
testimony that sports gambling would
generate revenues for New Jersey's
struggling casinos and racetracks. In 2011,
the Legislature held a referendum asking
New Jersey voters whether sports gambling
should be permitted, and sixty-four percent
voted in favor of amending the New Jersey
Constitution to permit sports gambling. The
constitutional amendment provided:

I. Background
Congress passed PASPA in 1992 to prohibit
state-sanctioned sports gambling. PASPA
provides:
It shall be unlawful for—

It shall also be lawful for the Legislature to
authorize by law wagering at casinos or
gambling houses in Atlantic City on the
results of any professional, college, or
amateur sport or athletic event, except that
wagering shall not be permitted on a college
sport or athletic event that takes place in New
Jersey or on a sport or athletic event in which
any New Jersey college team participates
regardless of where the event takes place....

(1) a governmental entity to sponsor, operate,
advertise, promote, license, or authorize by
law or compact, or
(2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or
promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a
governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes,
or other betting, gambling, or wagering
scheme based ... on one or more competitive
games in which amateur or professional
athletes participate, or are intended to
participate, or on one or more performances
of such athletes in such games.

The amendment thus permitted the New
Jersey Legislature to “authorize by law”
sports “wagering at casinos or gambling
houses in Atlantic City,” except that
wagering was not permitted on New Jersey
college teams or on any collegiate event
occurring in New Jersey. An additional
section of the amendment permitted the
Legislature to “authorize by law” sports
“wagering at current or former running and
harness horse racetracks,” subject to the same
restrictions regarding New Jersey college
teams and collegiate events occurring in New
Jersey.

PASPA defines “governmental entity” to
include states and their political subdivisions.
It includes a remedial provision that permits
any sports league whose games are or will be
the subject of sports gambling to bring an
action to enjoin the gambling.
Congress included in PASPA exceptions for
state-sponsored sports wagering in Nevada
and sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware,
and also an exception for New Jersey but only
if New Jersey were to enact a sports gambling
scheme within one year of PASPA's

After voters approved the sports-wagering
constitutional amendment, the New Jersey
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Legislature enacted the Sports Wagering Act
in 2012 (“2012 Law”), which provided for
regulated sports wagering at New Jersey's
casinos and racetracks. The 2012 Law
established a comprehensive regulatory
scheme, requiring licenses for operators and
individual
employees,
extensive
documentation, minimum cash reserves, and
Division of Gaming Enforcement access to
security and surveillance systems.

an affirmative prohibition of an activity does
not mean it is affirmatively authorized by
law. The right to do that which is not
prohibited derives not from the authority of
the state but from the inherent rights of the
people.” In short, we concluded that the New
Jersey Parties' argument rested on a “false
equivalence
between
repeal
and
authorization.” The New Jersey Parties
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States, which denied certiorari.

Five sports leagues1 sued to enjoin the 2012
Law as violative of PASPA. The New Jersey
Parties did not dispute that the 2012 Law
violated PASPA, but urged instead that
PASPA was unconstitutional under the anticommandeering doctrine. The District Court
held that PASPA was constitutional and
enjoined implementation of the 2012 Law.
The New Jersey Parties appealed, and we
affirmed in National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Governor of New Jersey (Christie I).

Undeterred, in 2014, the Legislature passed
the 2014 Law, SB 2460, which provided in
part:
[A]ny rules and regulations that may
require or authorize any State agency to
license, authorize, permit or otherwise take
action to allow any person to engage in the
placement or acceptance of any wager on any
professional, collegiate, or amateur sport
contest or athletic event, or that prohibit
participation in or operation of a pool that
accepts such wagers, are repealed to the
extent they apply or may be construed to
apply at a casino or gambling house operating
in this State in Atlantic City or a running or
harness horse racetrack in this State, to the
placement and acceptance of wagers on
professional, collegiate, or amateur sport
contests or athletic events....

In Christie I, we rejected the New Jersey
Parties' argument that PASPA was
unconstitutional by commandeering New
Jersey's legislative process. In doing so, we
stated that “[n]othing in [PASPA's] words
requires that the states keep any law in place.
All that is prohibited is the issuance of
gambling ‘license [s]’ or the affirmative
‘authoriz[ation] by law’ of gambling
schemes.” The New Jersey Parties had urged
that PASPA commandeered the state because
it prohibited the repeal of New Jersey's
prohibitions on sports gambling; they
reasoned that repealing a statute barring an
activity would be equivalent to authorizing
the activity, and “authorizing” was not
allowed by PASPA. We rejected that
argument, observing that “PASPA speaks
only of ‘authorizing by law’ a sports
gambling scheme,” and “[w]e [did] not see
how having no law in place governing sports
wagering is the same as authorizing it by
law.” We further emphasized that “the lack of

The 2014 Law specifically prohibited
wagering on New Jersey college teams'
competitions and on any collegiate
competition occurring in New Jersey, and it
limited sports wagering to “persons 21 years
of age or older situated at such location[s],”
namely casinos and racetracks.
II. Procedural
Arguments

History

and

Parties'

The Leagues filed suit to enjoin the New
Jersey Parties from giving effect to the 2014
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Law. The District Court held that the 2014
Law violates PASPA, granted summary
judgment in favor of the Leagues, and issued
a permanent injunction against the Governor
of New Jersey, the Director of the New Jersey
Division of Gaming Enforcement, and the
Executive Director of the New Jersey Racing
Commission (collectively, the “New Jersey
Enjoined Parties”). The District Court
interpreted Christie I as holding that PASPA
offers two choices to states: maintaining
prohibitions on sports gambling or
completely repealing them. It reasoned that
the 2014 Law runs afoul of PASPA because
the 2014 Law is a partial repeal that
necessarily results in sports wagering with
the State's imprimatur. The New Jersey
Parties appealed.

As a preliminary matter, we acknowledge the
2014 Law's salutary purpose in attempting to
legalize sports gambling to revive its troubled
casino and racetrack industries. The New
Jersey Assembly Gaming and Tourism
Committee chairman stated, in regard to the
2014 Law, that “[w]e want to give the
racetracks a shot in the arm. We want to help
Atlantic City. We want to do something for
the gaming business in the state of New
Jersey, which has been under tremendous
duress....” New Jersey State Senator Ray
Lesniak, a sponsor of the law, has likewise
stated that “[s]ports betting will be a lifeline
to the casinos, putting people to work and
generating economic activity in a growth
industry.” And New Jersey State Senator
Joseph Kyrillos stated that “New Jersey's
continued prohibition on sports betting at our
casinos and racetracks is contrary to our
interest of supporting employers that provide
tens of thousands of jobs and add billions to
our state's economy” and that “[s]ports
betting will help set New Jersey's wagering
facilities apart from the competition and
strengthen Monmouth Park and our
struggling casino industry.” PASPA has
clearly stymied New Jersey's attempts to
revive its casinos and racetracks and provide
jobs for its workforce.

On appeal, the New Jersey Parties argue that
the 2014 Law does not constitute an
authorization in violation of PASPA and it is
consistent with Christie I because the New
Jersey Legislature effected a repealer as
Christie I specifically permitted.
The Leagues urge that the 2014 Law violates
PASPA because it “authorizes by law” sports
wagering and also impermissibly “licenses”
the activity by confining the repeal of
gambling prohibitions to licensed gambling
facilities and thus, in effect, enlarging the
terms of existing gaming licenses. The
United States submitted an amicus brief in
support of the Leagues.

Moreover, PASPA is not without its critics,
even aside from its economic impact. It has
been criticized for prohibiting an activity,
i.e., sports gambling, that its critics view as
neither immoral nor dangerous. It has also
been criticized for encouraging the spread of
illegal sports gambling and for making it
easier to fix games, since it precludes the
transparency that accompanies legal
activities. Simply put, “[w]e are cognizant
that certain questions related to this case—
whether gambling on sporting events is
harmful to the games' integrity and whether
states should be permitted to license and

A panel of this Court affirmed in a divided
opinion, which was subsequently vacated.
Because we, sitting en banc, essentially agree
with the reasoning of the panel majority's
opinion, we incorporate much of it verbatim
in this opinion.
III. Analysis
A. The 2014 Law Violates PASPA
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profit from the activity—engender strong
views.” While PASPA's provisions and its
reach are controversial (and, some might say,
unwise), “we are not asked to judge the
wisdom of PASPA” and “[i]t is not our place
to usurp Congress' role simply because
PASPA may have become an unpopular
law.” We echo Christie I in noting that “New
Jersey and any other state that may wish to
legalize gambling on sports ... are not left
without redress. Just as PASPA once gave
New Jersey preferential treatment in the
context of gambling on sports, Congress may
again choose to do so or ... may choose to
undo PASPA altogether.” Unless that
happens, however, we are duty-bound to
interpret the text of the law as Congress wrote
it.

laws prohibiting sports gambling would
apply to the casinos and racetracks. Thus, the
2014 Law provides the authorization for
conduct that is otherwise clearly and
completely legally prohibited.
Second, the 2014 Law authorizes sports
gambling by selectively dictating where
sports gambling may occur, who may place
bets in such gambling, and which athletic
contests are permissible subjects for such
gambling. Under the 2014 Law, New Jersey's
sports gambling prohibitions are specifically
removed from casinos, gambling houses, and
horse racetracks as long as the bettors are
people age 21 or over, and as long as there are
no bets on either New Jersey college teams or
collegiate competitions occurring in New
Jersey. The word “authorize” means, inter
alia, “[t]o empower; to give a right or
authority to act,” or “[t]o permit a thing to be
done in the future.” The 2014 Law allows
casinos and racetracks and their patrons to
engage, under enumerated circumstances, in
conduct that other businesses and their
patrons cannot do. That selectiveness
constitutes
specific
permission
and
empowerment.

We now turn to the primary question before
us: whether the 2014 Law violates PASPA.
We hold that it does. Under PASPA, it shall
be unlawful for “a governmental entity to
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license,
or authorize by law or compact” sports
gambling. We conclude that the 2014 Law
violates PASPA because it authorizes by law
sports gambling.
First, the 2014 Law authorizes casinos and
racetracks to operate sports gambling while
other laws prohibit sports gambling by all
other entities. Without the 2014 Law, the
sports gambling prohibitions would apply to
casinos and racetracks. Appellants urge that
the 2014 Law does not provide authority for
sports gambling because we previously held
that “[t]he right to do that which is not
prohibited derives not from the authority of
the state but from the inherent rights of the
people” and that “[w]e do not see how having
no law in place governing sports wagering is
the same as authorizing it by law.” But this is
not a situation where there are no laws
governing sports gambling in New Jersey.
Absent the 2014 Law, New Jersey's myriad

Appellants urge that because the 2014 Law is
only a “repeal” removing prohibitions against
sports gambling, it is not an “affirmative
authorization” under Christie I. To the extent
that in Christie I we took the position that a
repeal cannot constitute an authorization, we
now reject that reasoning. Moreover, we do
not adopt the District Court's view that the
options available to a state are limited to two.
Neither of these propositions were necessary
to their respective rulings and were, in
essence, dicta. Furthermore, our discussion
of partial versus total repeals is similarly
unnecessary to determining the 2014 Law's
legality because the question presented here
is straightforward—i.e., what does the law
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do—and does not turn on the way in which
the state has enacted its directive.

surplusage. In order to avoid rendering the
New Jersey exception surplusage, we must
read the 2014 Law as authorizing a scheme
that clearly violates PASPA.

The presence of the word “repeal” does not
prevent us from examining what the
provision actually does, and the Legislature's
use of the term does not change that the 2014
Law selectively grants permission to certain
entities to engage in sports gambling. New
Jersey's sports gambling prohibitions remain,
and no one may engage in such conduct
except those singled out in the 2014 Law.
While artfully couched in terms of a repealer,
the 2014 Law essentially provides that,
notwithstanding any other prohibition by
law, casinos and racetracks shall hereafter be
permitted to have sports gambling. This is an
authorization.

As support for their argument that the 2014
Law does not violate PASPA, Appellants cite
the 2014 Law's construction provision, which
provides that “[t]he provisions of this act ...
are not intended and shall not be construed as
causing the State to sponsor, operate,
advertise, promote, license, or authorize by
law or compact” sports wagering. This
conveniently mirrors PASPA's language
providing that states may not “sponsor,
operate, advertise, promote, license, or
authorize by law or compact” sports
wagering.

Third, the exception in PASPA for New
Jersey, which the State did not take
advantage of before the one-year time limit
expired, is remarkably similar to the 2014
Law. The exception states that PASPA does
not apply to “a betting, gambling, or
wagering scheme ... conducted exclusively in
casinos ..., but only to the extent that ... any
commercial casino gaming scheme was in
operation ... throughout the 10-year period”
before PASPA was enacted. The exception
would have permitted sports gambling at
New Jersey's casinos, which is just what the
2014 Law does. We can easily infer that, by
explicitly excepting a scheme of sports
gambling in New Jersey's casinos from
PASPA's prohibitions, Congress intended
that such a scheme would violate PASPA. If
Congress had not perceived that sports
gambling in New Jersey's casinos would
violate PASPA, then it would not have
needed to insert the New Jersey exception. In
other words, if sports gambling in New
Jersey's casinos does not violate PASPA,
then PASPA's one-year exception for New
Jersey would have been superfluous. We will
not read statutory provisions to be

The construction provision does not save the
2014 Law. States may not use clever drafting
or mandatory construction provisions to
escape the supremacy of federal law. In the
same vein, the New Jersey Legislature cannot
use a targeted construction provision to limit
the reach of PASPA or to dictate to a court a
construction that would limit that reach. The
2014 Law violates PASPA, and the
construction provision cannot alter that fact.
Appellants also draw a comparison between
the 2014 Law and the 2012 Law, which
involved a broad regulatory scheme, as
evidence that the 2014 Law does not violate
PASPA. It is true that the 2014 Law does not
set forth a comprehensive scheme or provide
for a state regulatory role, as the 2012 Law
did. However, PASPA does not limit its reach
to active state involvement or extensive
regulation of sports gambling. It prohibits a
range of state activity, the least intrusive of
which is “authorization” by law of sports
gambling.
We conclude that the 2014 Law violates
PASPA because it authorizes by law sports
gambling.
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First, congressional action in passing laws in
otherwise pre-emptible fields has withstood
attack in cases where the states were not
compelled to enact laws or implement federal
statutes or regulatory programs themselves.
In Hodel, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a law that imposed
federal standards for coal mining. The law
left states a choice. A state could “assume
permanent regulatory authority over ...
surface coal mining operations” and “submit
a proposed permanent program” that
“demonstrate[s] that the state legislature has
enacted
laws
implementing
the
environmental protection standards ... and
that the State has the administrative and
technical ability to enforce the[ ] standards.”
However, if a state chose not to assume
regulatory authority, the federal government
would “administer[ ] the Act within that State
and continue[ ] as such unless and until a
‘state program’ [wa]s approved.” As we
described in Christie I:

B. PASPA Does Not Impermissibly
Commandeer the States
Appellants expend significant effort in this
appeal revisiting our conclusion in Christie I
that PASPA does not unconstitutionally
commandeer the states. They root this effort
in the District Court's erroneous conclusion
that PASPA presents states with a binary
choice—either maintain
a complete
prohibition on sports wagering or wholly
repeal state prohibitions. In Christie I, we
engaged in a lengthy discussion to rebut
Appellants' assertion that if we conclude that
New Jersey's repeal of its prohibition is not
permitted by PASPA, then it has
unconstitutionally commandeered New
Jersey. In so doing, we discussed the
Supreme Court's clear case law on
commandeering. Our prior conclusion that
PASPA does not run afoul of anticommandeering principles remains sound
despite Appellants' attempt to call it into
question using the 2014 Law as an exemplar.

The Supreme Court upheld the provisions,
noting that they neither compelled the states
to adopt the federal standards, nor required
them “to expend any state funds,” nor
coerced them into “participat[ing] in the
federal regulatory program in any manner
whatsoever.” The Court further concluded
that Congress could have chosen to
completely preempt the field by simply
assuming oversight of the regulations itself.
Id. It thus held that the Tenth Amendment
posed no obstacle to a system by which
Congress “chose to allow the States a
regulatory role.” As the Court later
characterized Hodel, the scheme there did not
violate the anti-commandeering principle
because it “merely made compliance with
federal standards a precondition to continued
state regulation in an otherwise preempted
field.”

1. Anti–Commandeering Jurisprudence
As we noted in Christie I, the Supreme
Court's anti-commandeering principle rests
on the conclusion that “Congress ‘lacks the
power directly to compel the States to require
or prohibit’ acts which Congress itself may
require or prohibit.” In our prior survey of the
anti-commandeering case law in Christie I,
we grouped four commandeering cases
upholding the federal laws at issue into two
categories: (1) permissible regulation in a
pre-emptible field; and (2) prohibitions on
state action. The Supreme Court has struck
down federal laws on anti-commandeering
grounds in only two cases, New York v.
United States and Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914
(1997). We summarize our prior review
below.
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the Supreme Court struck down a “take-title”
provision whereby states were required to
take title to radioactive waste by a specific
date, at the waste generator's request, if they
did not adopt a federal program. As we stated
in Christie I, the provision “compel[led] the
states to either enact a regulatory program, or
expend resources in taking title to the waste.”
The Supreme Court ultimately concluded in
New York that the take-title provision
“crossed
the
line
distinguishing
encouragement from coercion.” Similarly in
Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court
concluded that Congress “may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States'
officers ... to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program.”

The Supreme Court's opinion in F.E.R.C. v.
Mississippi the following year confirmed its
view that a law does not unconstitutionally
commandeer the states when the law does not
impose federal requirements on the states, but
leaves states the choice to decline to
implement federal standards.
Second, the Supreme Court has found
Congress's prohibition of certain state actions
to
not
constitute
unconstitutional
commandeering. In South Carolina v. Baker,
the Court upheld federal laws that prohibited
the issuance of bearer bonds, which required
states to amend legislation to be in
compliance. As we characterized this case in
Christie I:
The Court concluded this result did not run
afoul [of] the Tenth Amendment because it
did not seek to control or influence the
manner in which States regulate private
parties but was simply an inevitable
consequence of regulating a state activity. In
subsequent cases, the Court explained that
the regulation in Baker was permissible
because it simply subjected a State to the
same legislation applicable to private parties.

2. PASPA Does Not Violate
Commandeering Principles

Anti-

We continue to view PASPA's prohibition as
more akin to those laws upheld in Hodel,
F.E.R.C.,
Baker,
and
Reno,
and
distinguishable from those struck down by
the Supreme Court in New York and Printz.
Our articulation of the way in which PASPA
does not violate anti-commandeering
principles warrants refinement, however,
given the way in which the 2014 Law
attempted to skirt PASPA and the thrust of
Appellants' arguments in this appeal.

Later, in Reno v. Condon, the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a law that prohibited
states from releasing information gathered by
state departments of motor vehicles. The
Court ultimately concluded that the law at
issue “d[id] not require the States in their
sovereign capacity to regulate their own
citizens[,] ... d[id] not require the [State]
Legislature[s] to enact any laws or
regulations, and it d[id] not require state
officials to assist in the enforcement of
federal
statutes
regulating
private
individuals.”

In an attempt to reopen the anticommandeering question we previously
decided, Appellants creatively rely on certain
language that was used in Christie I. In
pressing for a declaration that PASPA
unconstitutionally commandeered the states
in Christie I, Appellants characterized
PASPA as requiring the states to
affirmatively keep a prohibition against
sports wagering on their books, lest they be
found to have authorized sports gambling by
law by repealing the prohibition. In response,

As noted above, the Supreme Court has
invalidated laws on anti-commandeering
grounds on only two occasions. In New York,
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we opined that Appellants' position “rest[ed]
on a false equivalence between repeal and
authorization,” implying that a repeal is not
an authorization. Before us now Appellants
urge that “[t]his Court held [in Christie I] that
PASPA is constitutional precisely because it
permits States to elect not to prohibit sports
wagering, even if affirmatively authorizing it
would be unlawful.” Appellants are saying,
in effect, “We told you so”—if the legislature
cannot repeal New Jersey's prohibition as it
attempted to do in the 2014 Law, then it is
required to affirmatively keep the prohibition
on the books, and PASPA unconstitutionally
commandeers the states. We reject this
argument.

actions, and it does not present a coercive
binary choice. Our reasoning in Christie I that
PASPA does not commandeer the states
remains unshaken.
Appellants characterize the 2014 Law as a
lawful exercise in the space PASPA affords
states to create their own policy. They argue
that without options beyond a complete
repeal or a complete ban on sports wagering,
such as the partial repeal New Jersey pursued,
PASPA runs afoul of anti-commandeering
principles. This argument sweeps too
broadly. That a specific partial repeal which
New Jersey chose to pursue in its 2014 Law
is not valid under PASPA does not preclude
the possibility that other options may pass
muster. The issue of the extent to which a
given
repeal
would
constitute an
authorization, in a vacuum, is not before us,
as it was not specifically before us in Christie
I. However, as the Leagues noted at oral
argument before the en banc court, not all
partial repeals are created equal. For instance,
a state's partial repeal of a sports wagering
ban to allow de minimis wagers between
friends and family would not have nearly the
type of authorizing effect that we find in the
2014 Law. We need not, however, articulate
a line whereby a partial repeal of a sports
wagering ban amounts to an authorization
under PASPA, if indeed such a line could be
drawn. It is sufficient to conclude that the
2014 Law overstepped it.

That said, we view our discussion in Christie
I regarding the relationship between a
“repeal” and an “authorization” to have been
too facile. While we considered whether
repeal and authorization are interchangeable,
our decision did not rest on that discussion.
Today, we choose to excise that discussion
from our prior opinion as unnecessary dicta.
To be clear, a state's decision to selectively
remove a prohibition on sports wagering in a
manner that permissively channels wagering
activity to particular locations or operators is,
in essence, “authorization” under PASPA.
However, our determination that such a
selective repeal of certain prohibitions
amounts to authorization under PASPA does
not mean that states are not afforded
sufficient room under PASPA to craft their
own policies.

Appellants seize on the District Court's
erroneous interpretation of Christie I's anticommandeering analysis—namely, that
PASPA presents states with a strict binary
choice between total repeal and keeping a
complete ban on their books—to once again
urge that if PASPA commands such a choice,
then it is comparable to the challenged law in
New York. First, unlike the take-title
provision included in the statute at issue in
New York, PASPA's text does not present

Appellants urge that our conclusion in
Christie I that PASPA does not
unconstitutionally commandeer the states
rested on our view that PASPA allows states
to “choos[e] among many different potential
policies on sports wagering that do not
include licensing or affirmative authorization
by the State.” This is correct. PASPA does
not command states to take affirmative
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states with a coercive choice to adopt a
federal program. To interpret PASPA to
require such a coercive choice is to read
something into the statute that simply is not
there.

I, that it does not
commandeer the states.

unconstitutionally

IV. Conclusion
The 2014 Law violates PASPA because it
authorizes by law sports gambling. We
continue to find PASPA constitutional. We
will affirm.

Second, PASPA is further distinguishable
from the law at issue in New York because it
does not require states to take any action. In
New York, the Supreme Court held that a
federal law that required states to enact a
federal regulatory program or take title to
radioactive waste at the behest of generators
“crossed
the
line
distinguishing
encouragement from coercion.” Unlike the
law at issue in New York, PASPA includes
no coercive direction by the federal
government. As we previously concluded in
Christie I, PASPA does not command states
to take any affirmative steps:

FUENTES, joined by RESTREPO, Circuit
Judges, dissenting:
In November 2011, the question of whether
to allow sports betting in New Jersey went
before the electorate. By a 2-1 margin, New
Jersey voters passed a referendum to amend
the New Jersey Constitution to allow the New
Jersey Legislature to “authorize by law”
sports betting.1 Accordingly, the Legislature
enacted the 2012 Sports Wagering Act
(“2012 Law”). The Sports Leagues
challenged this Law, claiming that it violated
the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act's (“PASPA”) prohibition on
states “authoriz[ing] by law” sports betting.2
In Christie I, we agreed with the Sports
Leagues and held that the 2012 Law violated
and thus was preempted by PASPA. We
explained, however, that New Jersey was free
to repeal the sports betting prohibitions it
already had in place. We rejected the
argument that a repeal of prohibitions on
sports betting was equivalent to authorizing
by law sports betting. When the matter was
brought to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor
General echoed that same sentiment, stating
that, “PASPA does not even obligate New
Jersey to leave in place the state-law
prohibitions against sports gambling that it
had chosen to adopt prior to PASPA's
enactment. To the contrary, New Jersey is
free to repeal those prohibitions in whole or
in part.”

PASPA does not require or coerce the
states to lift a finger—they are not required to
pass laws, to take title to anything, to conduct
background checks, to expend any funds, or
to in any way enforce federal law. They are
not even required, like the states were in
F.E.R.C., to expend resources considering
federal regulatory regimes, let alone to adopt
them. Simply put, we discern in PASPA no
directives requiring the States to address
particular problems and no commands to the
States' officers to administer or enforce a
federal regulatory program.
Put simply, PASPA does not impose a
coercive either-or requirement or affirmative
command.
We will not allow Appellants to bootstrap
already decided questions of PASPA's
constitutionality onto our determination that
the 2014 Law violates PASPA. We reject the
notion that PASPA presents states with a
coercive binary choice or affirmative
command and conclude, as we did in Christie
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sports betting prohibitions, since, “in reality,
the lack of an affirmative prohibition of an
activity does not mean it is affirmatively
authorized by law.” As we noted, “that the
Legislature needed to enact the [2012 Law]
itself belies any contention that the mere
repeal of New Jersey's ban on sports
gambling was sufficient to ‘authorize [it] by
law.’ ” The Legislature itself “saw a
meaningful distinction between repealing the
ban on sports wagering and authorizing it by
law, undermining any contention that the
amendment alone was sufficient to
affirmatively authorize sports wagering—the
[2012 Law] was required.” In short, we
explained that there was a false equivalence
between repeal and authorization.

So New Jersey did just that. In 2014, the New
Jersey Legislature repealed certain sports
betting prohibitions at casinos and gambling
houses in Atlantic City and at horse
racetracks in the State (“2014 Repeal”). In
addition to repealing the 2012 Law in full, the
2014 Repeal stripped New Jersey of any
involvement in sports betting, regulatory or
otherwise. In essence, the 2014 Repeal
rendered previous prohibitions on sports
betting non-existent.
But the majority today concludes that the
New Jersey Legislature's efforts to satisfy its
constituents while adhering to our decision in
Christie I are still in violation of PASPA.
According to the majority, the “selective”
nature of the 2014 Repeal amounts to
“authorizing by law” a sports wagering
scheme. That is, because the State retained
certain restrictions on sports betting, the
majority infers the authorization by law. I
cannot agree with this interpretation of
PASPA.

With the 2014 Repeal, the New Jersey
Legislature did what it thought it was
permitted to do under our reading of PASPA
in Christie I. The majority, however,
maintains that the 2014 Repeal “authorizes”
sports wagering at casinos, gambling houses,
and horse racetracks simply because other
sports betting prohibitions remain in place.
According to the majority, “[a]bsent the 2014
Law, New Jersey's myriad laws prohibiting
sports gambling would apply to the casinos
and racetracks,” and thus “the 2014 Law
provides the authorization for conduct that is
otherwise clearly and completely legally
prohibited.” But I believe the majority is
mistaken as to the impact of a partial repeal.
A repeal is defined as an “abrogation of an
existing law by legislative act.” When a
statute is repealed, “the repealed statute, in
regard to its operative effect, is considered as
if it had never existed.” If a repealed statute
is treated as if it never existed, a partially
repealed statute is treated as if the repealed
sections never existed. The 2014 Repeal,
then, simply returns New Jersey to the state it
was in before it first enacted those
prohibitions on sports gambling. In other
words, after the repeal, it is as if New Jersey

PASPA restricts the states in six ways—a
state cannot “sponsor, operate, advertise,
promote, license, or authorize by law or
compact” sports betting.4 The only one of
these six restrictions that includes “by law” is
“authorize.” None of the other restrictions
say anything about how the states are
restricted. Thus, I believe that Congress gave
this restriction a special meaning—that a
state's “authoriz[ation] by law” of sports
betting cannot merely be inferred, but rather
requires a specific legislative enactment that
affirmatively allows the people of the state to
bet on sports. Any other interpretation would
be reading the phrase “by law” out of the
statute.
Indeed, we stated exactly this in Christie I—
that all PASPA prohibits is “the affirmative
‘authoriz[ation] by law’ of gambling
schemes.” Thus, we explained, nothing
prevented New Jersey from repealing its
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never prohibited sports wagering at casinos,
gambling houses, and horse racetracks.
Therefore, with respect to those locations,
there are no laws governing sports wagering.
Contrary to the majority's position, the
permission to engage in such an activity is not
affirmatively granted by virtue of it being
prohibited elsewhere.

could occur? Surely no conceivable reading
of PASPA would preclude a state from
restricting sports wagering in this scenario.
Yet the 2014 Repeal comes to the same
result.
The majority also fails to illustrate how the
2014 Repeal results in sports wagering
pursuant to state law when there is effectively
no law in place as to several locations, no
scheme created, and no state involvement. A
careful comparison with the 2012 Law is
instructive. The 2012 Law lifted New Jersey's
ban on sports wagering and created a
licensing scheme for sports wagering pools at
casinos and racetracks in the State. This
comprehensive regime required close State
supervision and regulation of those sports
wagering pools. For instance, the 2012 Law
required any entity that wished to operate a
“sports pool lounge” to acquire a “sports pool
license.” To do so, a prospective operator was
required to pay a $50,000 application fee,
secure Division of Gaming Enforcement
(“DGE”) approval of all internal controls,
and ensure that any of its employees who
were to be directly involved in sports
wagering obtained individual licenses from
the DGE and the Casino Control Commission
(“CCC”). In addition, the betting regime
required entities to, among other things,
submit extensive documentation to the DGE,
adopt new “house” rules subject to DGE
approval, and conform to DGE standards.
This, of course, violated PASPA in the most
basic way: New Jersey developed an intricate
scheme that both “authorize[d] by law” and
“license[d]” sports gambling. The 2014
Repeal eliminated this entire scheme.
Moreover, all state agencies with jurisdiction
over state casinos and racetracks, such as the
DGE and the CCC, were stripped of any
sports betting oversight.

To bolster its position, the majority rejects
our reasoning in Christie I, stating that “[t]o
the extent that in Christie I we took the
position that a repeal cannot constitute an
authorization, we now reject that reasoning.”
I continue to maintain, however, that the
2014 Repeal is not an affirmative
authorization by law. It is merely a repeal—
it does not, and cannot, authorize by law
anything.
In my view, the majority's position that the
2014 Repeal “selectively grants permission
to certain entities to engage in sports
gambling” is simply incorrect. There is no
explicit grant of permission in the 2014
Repeal for any person or entity to engage in
sports gambling. Rather, the 2014 Repeal is a
self-executing deregulatory measure that
repeals existing prohibitions and regulations
for sports betting and requires the State to
abdicate any control or involvement in sports
betting. The majority fails to explain why a
partial repeal is equivalent to a grant of
permission (by law) to engage in sports
betting.
Suppose the State did exactly what the
majority suggests it could have done: repeal
completely its sports betting prohibitions. In
that circumstance, sports betting could occur
anywhere in the State and there would be no
restrictions as to age, location, or whether a
bettor could wager on games involving local
teams. Would the State violate PASPA if it
later enacted limited restrictions regarding
age requirements and places where wagering

The majority likewise falters when it
analogizes the 2014 Repeal to the exception
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Congress originally offered to New Jersey in
1992. The exception stated that PASPA did
not apply to “a betting, gambling, or
wagering scheme ... conducted exclusively in
casinos[,] ... but only to the extent that ... any
commercial casino gaming scheme was in
operation ... throughout the 10-year period”
before PASPA was enacted. Setting aside the
most obvious distinction between the 2014
Repeal and the 1992 exception—that it
contemplated a scheme that the 2014 Repeal
does not authorize—the majority misses the
mark when it states: “If Congress had not
perceived that sports gambling in New
Jersey's casinos would violate PASPA, then
it would not have needed to insert the New
Jersey exception.” Congress did not,
however, perceive, or intend for, private
sports wagering in casinos to violate PASPA.
Instead, Congress prohibited sports wagering
undertaken pursuant to state law. That the
2014 Repeal might bring about an increase in
the amount of private, legal sports wagering
in New Jersey is of no moment, and the
majority's reliance on such a possibility is
misplaced. The majority is also wrong in a
more fundamental way. The exception
Congress offered to New Jersey was exactly
that: an exception to the ordinary prohibitions
of PASPA. That is to say, with this exception,
New Jersey could have “sponsor[ed],
operate[d],
advertise[d],
promote[d],
license[d], or authorize[d] by law or
compact” sports wagering. Under the 2014
Repeal, of course, New Jersey cannot and
does not aim to do any of these things.

prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power
directly to compel the States to require or
prohibit those acts.” Concluding that the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act (“PASPA”), was a congressional
command that States must prohibit wagering
on sporting events because it forbids the
States from “authoriz[ing] by law” such
activity, I dissented from the holding in
Christie I that PASPA was a valid exercise of
congressional authority. My colleagues in the
majority in Christie I disagreed with my
conclusion because they believed that States
had the option of repealing existing bans on
sports betting. In upholding PASPA, Christie
I rejected New Jersey's argument that a repeal
of its ban on sports betting would be viewed
as effectively “authoriz[ing] by law” this
activity. Christie I declared that New Jersey's
“attempt to read into PASPA a requirement
that the states must affirmatively keep a ban
on sports gambling in their books rests on a
false equivalence between repeal and
authorization.” I viewed that “false
equivalence” assertion with considerable
skepticism. My skepticism is validated by
today's majority opinion. The majority
dodges the inevitable conclusion that PASPA
conscripts the States to prohibit wagering on
sports by suggesting that some partial repeal
of the ban on sports gambling would not be
tantamount to authorization of gambling.
Implicit in today's majority opinion and
Christie I is the premise that Congress lacks
the authority to decree that States must
prohibit sports wagering, and so both
majorities find some undefined room for
States to enact partial repeals of existing bans
on sports gambling. While the author of
Christie I finds that New Jersey's partial
repeal at issue here is not the equivalent of
authorizing by law wagering on sporting
events, today's majority concludes otherwise.
This shifting line approach to a State's
exercise of its sovereign authority is

Because I do not see how a partial repeal of
prohibitions is tantamount to authorizing by
law a sports wagering scheme in violation of
PASPA, I respectfully dissent.
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
While Congress “has the authority under the
Constitution to pass laws requiring or
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distinction,” and “agree[d] with [New Jersey]
that the affirmative act requirement, if not
properly applied, may permit Congress to
‘accomplish
exactly
what
the
commandeering doctrine prohibits' by
stopping the states from ‘repealing an
existing law.’ ” Christie I, however,
discounted concerns regarding PASPA's
affirmative act requirement because Christie
I “d[id] not read PASPA to prohibit New
Jersey from repealing its ban on sports
wagering.” According to Christie I, PASPA
is constitutional because “[n]othing in
[PASPA's] words requires that the states keep
any law in place.” This conclusion formed
the premise for the conclusion in Christie I
that PASPA passed constitutional muster.

untenable. The bedrock principle of
federalism that Congress may not compel the
States to require or prohibit certain activities
cannot be evaded by the false assertion that
PASPA affords the States some undefined
options when it comes to sports wagering.
Because I believe that PASPA was intended
to compel the States to prohibit wagering on
sporting events, it cannot survive
constitutional scrutiny. Accordingly, as I did
in Christie I, I dissent.
I.
According to the majority, “a state's decision
to selectively remove a prohibition on sports
wagering in a manner that permissively
channels wagering activity to particular
locations or operators is, in essence,
‘authorization’ under PASPA.” The majority
also claims “a state's partial repeal of a sports
wagering ban to allow de minimis wagers
between friends and family would not have
nearly the type of authorizing effect that we
find in the 2014 Law.” Thus, according to the
majority, the 2014 Law is a partial repeal that
is foreclosed by PASPA, but “other options
may pass muster” because “not all partial
repeals are created equal.”

Remarkably, the majority chooses to “excise
that discussion from our prior opinion as
unnecessary dicta.” Maj. Op., at 401. This
cannot be the case, however, because that
discussion was the cornerstone of the holding
in Christie I.
Indeed, to rationalize its conclusion in
Christie I, the Christie I majority had to
expressly reject the notion that when a state
“choose [s] to repeal an affirmative
prohibition of sports gambling, that is the
same as ‘authorizing’ that activity, and
therefore PASPA precludes repealing
prohibitions on gambling just as it bars
affirmatively licensing it.” This aspect of
Christie I was not peripheral to the ultimate
holding because Christie I specifically
“agree[d] with [New Jersey] that the
affirmative act requirement, if not properly
applied, may permit Congress to ‘accomplish
exactly what the commandeering doctrine
prohibits' by stopping the states from
‘repealing an existing law.’ ” Thus, to resolve
the issue before it, Christie I necessarily had
to give this issue the “full and careful
consideration of the court.”

Noticeably, the majority does not explain
why all partial repeals are not created equal
or explain what distinguishes the 2014 Law
from those partial repeals that pass muster.
To further complicate matters, the majority
continues to rely on Christie I, which did “not
read PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from
repealing its ban on sports wagering” and
informed New Jersey that “[n]othing in
[PASPA's] words requires that the states keep
any law in place.”
A.
Christie I “[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of
the
affirmative/negative
command
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room for the states to make their own policy”
and left it to a State “to decide how much of
a law enforcement priority it wants to make
of sports gambling, or what the exact
contours of the prohibition will be.”

In giving the issue its full and careful
consideration, Christie I explained that the
notion that a “repeal” could be the same as an
“authorization” was “problematic in
numerous respects.” Christie I did “not see
how having no law in place governing sports
wagering is the same as authorizing it by
law.” Christie I recognized a distinction
between affirmative commands for actions
and prohibitions, and explained that there
was “a false equivalence between repeal and
authorization.” Thus, as a matter of statutory
construction, and to avoid “a series of
constitutional
problems,”
Christie
I
specifically held that if the Court did not
distinguish between “repeals” (affirmative
commands) and “authorizations” (affirmative
prohibitions), the Court would “read[ ] the
term ‘by law’ out of [PASPA].”

Today's majority makes it clear that PASPA
does not leave a State “much room” at all.
Indeed, it is evident that States must leave
gambling prohibitions on the books to
regulate their citizens. A review of the four
Supreme Court anti-commandeering cases
referenced by the majority is illuminating.
1.
The first two anti-commandeering cases that
the majority reviews are Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.,
and F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi. As the majority
points out, these cases address “permissible
regulation in a pre-emptible field.” In
analyzing these cases, however, the majority
overlooks the main rule announced by the
Supreme Court in situations where there is an
exercise of legislative authority under the
Commerce Clause or where Congress
preempts an area with federal legislation
within its legislative power. In such
situations, States have a choice: they may
either comply with the federal legislation or
the Federal Government will carry the
legislation into effect.

I dissented from that opinion because “any
distinction between a federal directive that
commands states to take affirmative action
and one that prohibits states from exercising
their sovereignty is illusory.” The decision to
base Christie I on a distinction between
affirmative commands for action and
affirmative prohibitions was “untenable,”
because “affirmative commands to engage in
certain conduct can be rephrased as a
prohibition against not engaging in that
conduct.” As I explained, basing Christie I on
such an illusory distinction raises
constitutional concerns because “[a]n
interpretation of federalism principles that
permits congressional negative commands to
state governments will eviscerate the
constitutional lines drawn” by the Supreme
Court.
B.
After Christie I, a state like New Jersey at
least had the choice to either “repeal its sports
wagering ban,” or, “[o]n the other hand ...
keep a complete ban on sports gambling.”
The Christie I majority found that this choice
was not too coercive because it left “much

This rule was announced in Hodel, where the
Supreme Court explained that “[i]f a State
does not wish to ... compl[y] with the Act and
implementing regulations, the full regulatory
burden will be borne by the Federal
Government.” The same theme repeated
itself in F.E.R.C., as the Supreme Court
focused on “the choice put to the States—that
of either abandoning regulation of the field
altogether or considering the federal
standards.” In both cases, the Supreme Court
was clear that there must be some choice for
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the states to make because without it “the
accountability of both state and federal
officials is diminished.”

This leads to the other two anticommandeering cases reviewed by the
majority: South Carolina v. Baker, and Reno
v. Condon. The majority explains that these
cases address permissible “prohibitions on
state action.” Again, however, the majority
seems to overlook the animating factor for
each of these opinions. In both Baker and
Reno the Supreme Court explained that
permissible prohibitions regulated State
activities. The Supreme Court has never
sanctioned statutes or regulations that sought
to control or influence the manner in which
States regulate private parties.

Indeed, in New York v. United States, the
Court explained that a State's view on
legislation “can always be pre-empted under
the Supremacy Clause if it is contrary to the
national view, but in such a case ... it will be
federal officials that suffer the consequences
if the decision turns out to be detrimental or
unpopular.” The Supreme Court reiterated
this point Printz v. United States, explaining
that, “[b]y forcing state governments to
absorb the financial burden of implementing
a federal regulatory program, Members of
Congress can take credit for ‘solving’
problems without having to ask their
constituents to pay for the solutions with
higher federal taxes.” Thus, States must be
given a choice because the Supreme Court is
concerned that “it may be state officials who
will bear the brunt of public disapproval,
while the federal officials who devised the
regulatory program may remain insulated
from the electoral ramifications of their
decision.”

For example, in Baker, the Supreme Court
reviewed a challenge to the Internal Revenue
Code's enactment of § 310(b)(1) of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
which prohibited States from issuing
unregistered bearer bonds. Notably, when
reviewing the case, the Court specifically
found that it did not need to address “the
possibility that the Tenth Amendment might
set some limits on Congress' power to compel
States to regulate on behalf of federal
interests” because the Court found that the
commandeering concerns “in FERC [were]
inapplicable to § 310.” Importantly, the Court
distinguished § 310 from the statute in
F.E.R.C. because the Court found that
“Section 310 regulates state activities; it does
not, as did the statute in FERC, seek to
control or influence the manner in which
States regulate private parties.” Similarly, in
Reno, the Court addressed a statute that did
not require (1) “the States in their sovereign
capacity to regulate their own citizens,” (2)
“the ... Legislature to enact any laws or
regulations,” or (3) “state officials to assist in
the enforcement of federal statutes regulating
private individuals.” It was only on these
bases that the Supreme Court found the
statute at issue in Reno was “consistent with

As the majority explains, while “PASPA's
provisions and its reach are controversial
(and, some might say, unwise).... we are
duty-bound to interpret the text of the law as
Congress wrote it.” Because the majority has
excised the distinction between a repeal and
an authorization, the majority makes it clear
that under PASPA as written, no repeal of
any kind will evade the command that no
State “shall ... authorize by law” sports
gambling. In the face of such a congressional
directive, “no case-by-case weighing of the
burdens or benefits is necessary; such
commands are fundamentally incompatible
with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty.”
2.
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the constitutional principles enunciated in
New York and Printz.”

considered Congress' legislative power to be
so expansive.

Unlike the statutes at issue in Baker and
Reno, however, PASPA seeks to control and
influence the manner in which States regulate
private parties. Through PASPA, Congress
unambiguously commands that “[i]t shall be
unlawful for ... a governmental entity to ...
authorize by law” sports gambling. 28 U.S.C.
§ 3702. By issuing this command, Congress
has set an impermissible “mandatory agenda
to be considered in all events by state
legislative
or
administrative
decisionmakers.”

II.
It is now apparent that Christie I was
incorrect in finding that “nothing in
[PASPA's] words requires that the states keep
any law in place.” With respect to the
doctrinal anchors of Christie I, the
cornerstone of its holding has been eroded by
the majority, which has excised Christie I's
discussion regarding “a false equivalence
between repeal and an authorization.”
Notably, that discussion was included in
Christie I to avoid “a series of constitutional
problems.” Today's majority makes it clear
that passing a law so that there is no law in
place governing sports wagering is the same
as authorizing it by law.

3.
The logical extension of the majority is that
PASPA prevents States from passing any
laws to repeal existing gambling laws. As the
majority correctly notes, “[t]he word
‘authorize’ means, inter alia, ‘[t]o empower;
to give a right or authority to act,’ or ‘[t]o
permit a thing to be done in the future.’ ”
Because authorization includes permitting a
thing to be done, it follows that PASPA also
prevents state officials from stopping
enforcement of existing gambling laws.
States must regulate conduct prioritized by
Congress.

I dissented in Christie I because the
distinction between repeal and authorization
is unworkable. Today's majority opinion
validates my position: PASPA leaves the
States with no choice. While Christie I at
least gave the States the option of repealing,
in whole or in part, existing bans on gambling
on sporting events, today's decision tells the
States that they must maintain an anti-sports
wagering scheme. The anti-commandeering
doctrine, essential to protect State
sovereignty, prohibits Congress from
compelling States to prohibit such private
activity. Accordingly, I dissent.

It is true that civil actions to enjoin a violation
of PASPA “may be commenced in an
appropriate district court of the United States
by the Attorney General of the United
States.” But it can hardly be said that the
United States Attorney General bears the full
regulatory burden because, through PASPA,
Congress effectively commands the States to
maintain and enforce existing gambling
prohibitions.1
PASPA is a statute that directs States to
maintain gambling laws by dictating the
manner in which States must enforce a
federal law. The Supreme Court has never
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“New Jersey’s Appeal of Sports Betting Ban Heads to Supreme Court”
The New York Times
Nick Corasanti, Joe Drape
June 27, 2017

The Supreme Court agreed on Tuesday to
hear an appeal from Gov. Chris Christie and
the state of New Jersey to allow betting on
professional and collegiate sports at the
state’s casinos and racetracks.

which issued a ruling last year upholding the
federal ban.

The case, which the court will hear in the fall,
will be a major test for the federal ban on
sports betting as established by the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act, known as Paspa, which Congress passed
in 1992 outlawing betting on amateur or
professional athletes except in four states that
already had operations.

“The fact that the Supreme Court granted
cert. in this case is a very good sign for sports
betting having a future in New Jersey,” he
said. “I’m encouraged by it. We’re not
declaring victory, but at least we’re in the
game, and that’s what we want to be.”

In a news conference in Trenton on Tuesday,
Mr. Christie said he was “thrilled” by the
decision of the court.

The decision by the Supreme Court to hear
the case comes as a bit of a surprise after
Jeffrey B. Wall, the acting solicitor general of
the United States, asked the court in May not
to hear the case.

New Jersey has been fighting either to
overturn the federal ban or to find a way to
work around it since 2011, when voters in the
state approved a nonbinding resolution to
allow sports betting. The effort has since
been supported by Democratic and
Republican legislators as a way to help shore
up the sagging Atlantic City casinos and state
racetracks.

Numerous states, including Pennsylvania,
New York and California, have recently
pushed bills to legalize sports betting. Sports
betting podcasts like “Against All Odds”
regularly crack the top sports charts on
iTunes. Daily fantasy sports sites like
DraftKings and FanDuel, which offer a very
specific type of sports wagering, remain quite
popular.

But the effort was met with lawsuits from the
N.C.A.A. and the four major sports leagues
after Mr. Christie signed a law in 2014 to
allow sports betting. The challenges wound
their way through numerous lower courts,
finally reaching the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Philadelphia,

At stake is a significant amount of money. In
Nevada, where sports betting is legal, it is
now an industry of nearly $5 billion a year.
Industry and law enforcement officials
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estimate that more than $150 billion is placed
annually with illegal bookmakers and with
offshore accounts.

approved the move of the Oakland Raiders to
Las Vegas.
Mr. Freeman, however, acknowledged that
the N.C.A.A. remained the most concerted
opponent to legalized sports gambling,
noting that collegiate athletes are unpaid
amateurs. He said one possible solution
would be to prohibit betting on college
football and basketball.

With that much at stake, the American
Gaming Association announced the creation
of a coalition this month encompassing
attorneys general, the police, policy makers
and others to advocate a repeal of the federal
ban.
“We are pleased the Supreme Court appears
to have responded favorably to our
arguments as to why they should hear this
important case,” said Geoff Freeman, the
president and chief executive of the gaming
association. “And we are hopeful their
engagement
will
provide
further
encouragement for Congress to take the steps
necessary to create a regulated sports betting
marketplace in the United States.”

The N.C.A.A. did not immediately comment
on the decision by the Supreme Court to hear
the case.
While the court has offered no indication of
how it might rule or why it was moving
forward with the case, some industry
advocates viewed the decision as a sign that
the federal ban might be nearing its end.
“Paspa’s days may be numbered,” said
Daniel Wallach, a sports and gambling
lawyer from Florida, who has tracked the
case closely. "The court can overturn federal
statute and provide a free and clear pathway
for Congress to take this up. It’s the perfect
time for the leagues, casino industry and
Congress to come together, and I think it
potentially opens sports betting up nationally
by the 2018 N.F.L. season.”

In a recent meeting with reporters for The
New York Times, Mr. Freeman said his
organization had detected a new willingness
among the sports leagues to make sports
betting legal. Adam Silver, the commissioner
of the N.B.A., has been forthright in calling
for legal betting and the openness that
accompanies it. Rob Manfred, the
commissioner of Major League Baseball, has
acknowledged that a sports betting market
would continue to fuel fan interest in
baseball.
The N.F.L., long an opponent of the bill, has
signaled a softening of that stance in recent
months with the commissioner, Roger
Goodell, saying the league’s thinking on
sports gambling was “evolving,” a shift
underscored in March when team owners
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“Supreme Court Still Mulling Over Hearing New Jersey Sports Betting
Case”
Forbes
Darren Heitner
January 17, 2017

The U.S. Supreme Court previously set
today, January 17, as the date that it would
likely decide whether to hear an appeal
brought by the State of New Jersey in its
attempt to legalize sports betting within its
borders. While the odds of the U.S. Supreme
Court accepting certiorari and hearing New
Jersey's case remain slim (approximately 1%
of petitioned cases are heard by the Court),
proponents of the legalization of sports
betting in New Jersey may have earned a
small win based on the Court's delay.

New Jersey, despite the U.S. Supreme Court
determining that it needs a bit more time to
ruminate on the case. The federal government
has previously taken the position that
coincides with the big four U.S. professional
sports leagues (NFL , MLB , NBA , NHL) as
well as the NCAA, which have opposed the
legalization of full-fledged sports betting
beyond Nevada's borders. The prohibition
dates back to 1992, when Congress passed a
law, the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (PASPA), which makes it
unlawful for any governmental entity to
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license
or authorize any betting, gambling or
wagering scheme based on games played by
amateur or professional athletes.

New Jersey remains hopeful that it will be
able to provide sports betting similar to Las
Vegas. (Photo by Ethan Miller/Getty Images)
Instead of deciding whether it would hear the
case, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that
it would wait on the U.S. Solicitor General to
weigh in on the issue. It is a better outcome
for the pending appeal than the more than 130
cases that had their petitions to be heard
denied earlier today.

However, a new U.S. Solicitor General will
soon be in place under President-Elect
Donald Trump, whom may not follow the
course set by prior administrations.
The U.S. Solicitor General will consider the
claims raised by New Jersey, which include
the state's position that PASPA is
unconstitutional. New Jersey has stated that it
is against the U.S. Constitution for the federal
government to usurp state rights and provide
Nevada with the ability to control a robust

"The Acting Solicitor General is invited to
file a brief in these cases expressing the views
of the United States," states the U.S. Supreme
Court's order.
As noted by John Brennan of The Record,
history would not necessarily bode well for
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sports betting scheme while denying New
Jersey and other states the same opportunity.
There is no clear timetable as to when a brief
will be filed by the U.S. Solicitor General. In
the meantime, the State of New Jersey and
those hoping to overturn PASPA will be
paying close attention to President-Elect
Trump's choice for the position. Above The
Law has delivered an educated guess as to the
list of names that Trump may be currently
considering.
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“New Jersey’s attempt at legalized sports betting suffers another big
setback in court”
The Washington Post
Matt Bonesteel
August 9, 2016

The U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals on
Tuesday upheld the prohibition of sports
gambling in New Jersey, ruling that the
state’s 2014 attempt at legalizing the practice
violated the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (PASPA), the 1992 federal
law that prohibits sports gambling in all but
four states: Nevada, Oregon, Montana and
Delaware.

involved in the regulation of sports gambling,
leaving that to the casinos and racetracks.
In turn, New Jersey asked that the entire
Third Circuit panel hear its argument, a socalled en banc hearing that is granted only
under exceptional circumstances. In
February, state attorneys presented their case
before all 12 active judges of the Third
Circuit.

New Jersey has made two attempts at
legalizing sports gambling in an attempt to
shore up the lagging fortunes of the state’s
Atlantic City casinos, which have been
decimated by the spread of legalized casino
gambling in neighboring states. The state has
been opposed by the NCAA, MLB, NBA,
NFL and NHL, who have long argued that the
expansion of legalized gambling violates
federal law.

In a 10-to-2 vote, the Third Circuit sided
Tuesday with the NCAA and the sports
leagues, though two of the judges wrote
dissenting opinions.
“We now hold that the District Court
correctly ruled that because PASPA, by its
terms, prohibits states from authorizing by
law sports gambling, and because the 2014
Law does exactly that, the 2014 Law violates
federal law,” Judge Marjorie Rendell wrote
in the majority opinion, adding that PASPA
is indeed constitutional because it does not
commandeer the states to enforce a federal
law not expressly written into the
Constitution.

The leagues won their first victory in U.S.
District Court, and last August a three-judge
panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that New Jersey’s most recent attempt
to legalize sports gambling, in 2014,
amounted to a de facto authorization, in
violation of PASPA, even though the state
only wanted to repeal its laws prohibiting
sports betting and would not actually be

In his dissent, Judge Julio M. Fuentes writes
that New Jersey’s attempted repeal of its
sports gambling prohibitions did not amount
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to an authorization of sports betting in the
state because New Jersey would not be
officially regulating sports gambling, instead
merely allowing it. A literal reading of
PASPA would allow such a move, Fuentes
writes. Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie, in a
separate dissent, repeated his earlier assertion
that PASPA as a whole is unconstitutional.
Bot Fuentes and Vanaskie had sided with
New Jersey in previous court decisions.
According to sports-law expert Daniel
Wallach, New Jersey has until Nov. 7 to
petition the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the
case, and State Sen. Raymond Lesniak, a
longtime supporter of legalized gambling,
told ESPN’s David Purdum that the state will
do exactly that. Both Wallach and Lesniak
both have their doubts about whether the
Supreme Court will hear the case, with
Lesniak on Tuesday calling it “a long shot.”
Wallach does note, however, that the rise of
daily fantasy sports and the specific
legalization of DFS in certain states may pave
the way for legalized sports gambling overall
in the United States, especially in light of the
fact that the professional leagues have
financial agreements with DFS companies in
place. States that have legalized DFS could
argue that the Department of Justice is
selectively enforcing PASPA by prohibiting
sports gambling but allowing legalized DFS.
“They can’t have it both ways. Either PASPA
applies to both or to neither,” Wallach says.
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Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC
16-499
Ruling Below: In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 808 F.3d 144 (C.A.2
(N.Y.),2015)
United States and foreign nationals, who were injured or captured by terrorists overseas, or
family members and estate representative of those who were injured, captured, or killed, brought
actions against bank which allegedly financed and facilitated activities of organizations that
committed attacks that took place in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, alleging violations
of Anti–Terrorism Act (ATA), the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), and federal common law. Actions
were consolidated. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Brian
M. Cogan, J., dismissed claims. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed.
Question Presented: Whether the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, categorically forecloses
corporate liability.

In re ARAB BANK, PLC ALIEN TORT STATUTE LITIGATION.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Decided on December 8, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
SACK, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiffs in this case filed five separate
lawsuits between 2004 and 2010 in the
United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York against the defendant.
The plaintiffs are aliens who were injured or
captured by terrorists overseas, or family
members and estate representatives of those
who were injured, captured, or killed. The
plaintiffs seek judgments against Arab Bank,
PLC—a bank headquartered in Jordan with
branches in various places around the
world—for
allegedly
financing
and
facilitating the activities of organizations that
committed the attacks that caused the
plaintiffs' injuries. It is undisputed that, as a

PLC,4 Arab Bank is a corporation for
purposes of this appeal.
The plaintiffs allege violations by Arab Bank
of the Anti–Terrorism Act (the “ATA”), the
Alien Tort Statute, and federal common law.
The ATS differs from the ATA in that,
among other things, it provides jurisdiction
only with respect to suits by “aliens,” while
the ATA provides jurisdiction only for suits
by “national[s] of the United States.”
Between 2007 and 2010, the plaintiffs'
federal common-law claims were dismissed
as redundant and lacking what the district
court called a “sound basis.” On May 24,
2013, the defendant also moved to dismiss
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the plaintiffs' ATS claims, arguing that the
law of this Circuit prohibits ATS suits against
corporate entities. In their briefing in the
district court, the plaintiffs responded to the
defendant's arguments on their merits but
also argued, in the alternative, that if the
district court granted the defendant's motion,
it should also reinstate the plaintiffs' federal
common-law claims or permit the plaintiffs
to plead related non-federal common-law
claims.

Court's decision in Kiobel II, is no longer
“good law,” or at least, does not control this
case. The plaintiffs also contend that the facts
alleged sufficiently touch and concern the
territory of the United States as required
under Kiobel II to support jurisdiction,
although they request that we remand to the
district court for an initial decision on this
issue. Finally, and in the alternative, the
plaintiffs request the opportunity either to
reinstate their federal common-law claims or
to amend their pleadings in order to plead
non-federal common-law claims.

On August 23,2013, the district court issued
the following order:

BACKGROUND
The law of this Circuit is that plaintiffs cannot
bring claims against corporations under the
ATS. A decision by a panel of the Second
Circuit “is binding unless and until it is
overruled by the Court en banc or by the
Supreme Court.” Because the Supreme Court
affirmed [this Circuit's Kiobel decision] on
other grounds, the Second Circuit's holding
on corporate liability under the ATS remains
intact. Nothing in the Supreme Court's
affirmance undercuts the authority of the
Second Circuit's decision. Plaintiffs' request
to reinstate their federal common law claims
or, in the alternative, assert non-federal
common law claims is denied. The federal
common law claims were dismissed not only
as redundant, but also because Plaintiffs
offered “no sound basis” for them. Plaintiffs
also offer no sound basis for repackaging
these claims under unidentified “non-federal
common law” theories.

I. The Plaintiffs' Claims
The plaintiffs in the underlying cases are U.S.
and foreign nationals who have brought suit
against Arab Bank for its alleged role in
facilitating terrorist operations that harmed
the plaintiffs. While the underlying cases
contain differing factual allegations, they are,
as the plaintiffs assert, “based on the same
nucleus of [purported] material facts.” In
recounting those facts to this Court, the
plaintiffs' briefing relies heavily on the
operative, amended complaint in Zur v. Arab
Bank, PLC. In providing a summary of the
facts of this case, we therefore draw, at times
verbatim, from the district court's thorough
opinion addressing a previous motion to
dismiss by Arab Bank in Zur.
According to the plaintiffs, over the past two
decades, four prominent Palestinian terrorist
organizations—the
Islamic
Resistance
Movement (“HAMAS”), the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”), the Al Aqsa Martyrs'
Brigade (“AAMB”), and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (“PFLP”)
(collectively “the terrorist organizations”)—
have conducted widespread murderous
attacks, including suicide bombings, against
citizens of Israel—mostly Jews. The terrorist

Soon thereafter, judgments on the pleadings
were entered in each of the individual cases
as to the ATS claims. The plaintiffs filed
timely appeals as to these claims.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue principally
that this Circuit's opinion in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., aff'd on other grounds,
when analyzed in light of the Supreme
129

organizations allegedly arranged those
attacks in part by promising, and later
delivering, financial payments to the relatives
of “martyrs” who were killed—along with
those who were injured or captured—while
perpetrating the attacks.

Strip branches. Supporters knew to donate to
HAMAS directly through Arab Bank because
the HAMAS website directed supporters to
make contributions to Arab Bank's Gaza
Strip branch, and because there were various
advertisements publicized throughout the
Middle East calling for donations to Arab
Bank accounts. According to the plaintiffs,
Arab Bank knew that the donations were
being collected for terrorist attacks.

The plaintiffs assert that the terrorist
organizations funded these attacks in two
ways. The organizations solicited public and
private donations directly and deposited them
in bank accounts throughout the Middle East.
The organizations also raised funds through
affiliated, purportedly charitable proxy
organizations, including two entities created
in Saudi Arabia: the Popular Committee for
Assisting the Palestinian Mujahideen and the
Saudi Committee for Aid to the Al–Quds
Intifada (the “Saudi Committee”). These two
organizations allegedly set up their own bank
accounts, under the shared label “Account
98,” at various banks in Saudi Arabia in order
to hold funds collected for the families of
“martyrs.”

Second, Arab Bank allegedly maintained
accounts that proxy organizations and
individuals used to raise funds for the
terrorist organizations. For example,
according to the amended complaint, Arab
Bank maintained accounts, solicited and
collected donations, and laundered funds for
some of the purported charitable
organizations that acted as fronts for the
terrorist organizations. Arab Bank also
maintained
accounts
for
individual
supporters of terrorist organizations such as
HAMAS and al Qaeda. Again, responsible
officials at Arab Bank purportedly knew that
the accounts of these various organizations
and individuals were being used to fund the
suicide bombings and other attacks
sponsored by the terrorist organizations.

According to the amended complaint, Arab
Bank—one of the largest financial
institutions in the Middle East, with branches
and subsidiaries in more than twenty-five
countries, including a New York branch that
provides clearing and correspondent banking
services to foreign financial institutions—
deliberately helped the terrorist organizations
and their proxies to raise funds for attacks and
make payments to the families of “martyrs.”
The plaintiffs further allege that Arab Bank
used some of those facilities—the New York
branch among them—to support the terrorist
organizations in three ways.

Third, Arab Bank allegedly played an active
role in identifying the families of “martyrs”
and facilitating payments to them from the
Saudi Committee's “Account 98” funds, on
behalf of the terrorist organizations.
According to the plaintiffs, Arab Bank first
worked with the Saudi Committee and
HAMAS to finalize lists of eligible
beneficiaries. Arab Bank then created
individual bank accounts for the beneficiaries
and facilitated transfers of “Account 98”
funds into those accounts, often routing the
transfers through its New York branch in
order to convert Saudi currency into Israeli
currency. Once the accounts were filled,
Arab Bank provided instructions to the public

First, Arab Bank allegedly maintained
accounts that the terrorist organizations used
to solicit funds directly. The plaintiffs allege,
with respect to HAMAS specifically, that
Arab Bank “collected” funds into HAMAS
accounts in its Beirut, Lebanon, and Gaza
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on how to qualify for and collect the money,
and made payments to beneficiaries with
appropriate documentation.

For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgments of the district court.
DISCUSSION

The plaintiffs allege that Arab Bank's
involvement
with
the
terrorist
organizations—particularly its facilitation of
payments to the families of “martyrs”—
incentivized and encouraged suicide
bombings and other murderous acts that
harmed the plaintiffs.

I. Standard of Review
“We review de novo a district court's decision
to grant a motion for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c).” In doing so, we “employ[ ]
the same ... standard applicable to dismissals
pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]
12(b)(6).” Thus, we “accept[ ] as true factual
allegations made in the complaint, and draw[
] all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiffs.” “To survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”

II. Procedural History
The plaintiffs in the consolidated cases filed
five separate lawsuits between 2004 and
2010 in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York against
Arab Bank alleging variations on the theme
of the foregoing facts. All five lawsuits
included tort claims under the ATS. At the
district court level, these cases were
consolidated, along with six others, for
discovery and pre-trial proceedings.

II. Corporate Liability Under the Alien
Tort Statute
We conclude that Kiobel I is and remains the
law of this Circuit, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel II
affirming this Court's judgment on other
grounds. We affirm the decision of the
district court on that basis. We do so despite
our view that Kiobel II suggests that the ATS
may allow for corporate liability and our
observation that there is a growing consensus
among our sister circuits to that effect.
Indeed, on the issue of corporate liability
under the ATS, Kiobel I now appears to swim
alone against the tide.

On August 23, 2013, the district court
dismissed the plaintiffs' ATS claims on the
basis of Kiobel I. At the time, ATS claims
were the only ones remaining in three of the
five cases before the district court: Jesner,
Lev, and Agurenko. Final judgments were
therefore filed in each of those cases on
August 28, 2013. The two remaining actions,
Almog and Afriat–Kurtzer, involved both
ATS claims and ATA claims, the latter of
which remained intact after the district court's
August 23, 2013 order. As a result, partial
final judgments as to the ATS claims were
issued in those cases on October 16, 2013.
The plaintiffs in all five cases appealed to this
Court from the judgments on the pleadings
regarding their ATS claims. On December
10, 2013, the plaintiffs collectively moved to
consolidate the appeals. We granted that
motion on January 6, 2014.

A. The Decisions in Kiobel I and Kiobel II
To repeat: The ATS provides, in full, that
“[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States.” In
Kiobel I, the panel divided over the breadth
of liability recognized by the “law of
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nations”—and, consequently, on whether
corporations may be held liable under the
ATS.

individual nations.” Judge Leval argued that
Sosa's footnote 20 is consistent with that view
inasmuch as it does no more than caution
courts to defer to the law of nations on the
scope of liability in those exceptional cases
where
customary
international
law
affirmatively bars recovery against private
actors:

The majority opinion, written by Judge
Cabranes and joined by then-Chief Judge
Jacobs, concluded that the ATS does not
permit claims against corporations because
“[n]o corporation has ever been subject to
any form of liability (whether civil, criminal,
or otherwise) under the customary
international law of human rights.” This
conclusion was based on the majority's view
that the law of nations must affirmatively
extend liability to “a particular class of
defendant, such as corporations,” before that
class of defendant may be held liable for
conduct that violates a substantive norm of
customary international law. As precedential
support for that view, the majority cited
footnote 20 in Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain. In
Sosa, commenting on the portion of the
opinion that instructed “federal courts ... not
[to] recognize private claims under federal
common law for violations of any
international law norm with less definite
content and acceptance among civilized
nations than the historical paradigms familiar
when § 1350 was enacted,” the Supreme
Court stated that “[a] related consideration is
whether international law extends the scope
of liability for a violation of a given norm to
the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is
a private actor such as a corporation or
individual.”

If the violated norm is one that
international law applies only against States,
then a private actor, such as a corporation or
an individual, who acts independently of a
State, can have no liability for violation of the
law of nations because there has been no
violation of the law of nations. On the other
hand, if the conduct is of the type classified
as a violation of the norms of international
law regardless of whether done by a State or
a private actor, then a private actor, such as a
corporation or an individual, has violated the
law of nations and is subject to liability in a
suit under the ATS. The majority's partial
quotation out of context, interpreting the
Supreme Court as distinguishing between
individuals and corporations, misunderstands
the meaning of the passage.
Under that view, the ATS does not prohibit
corporate liability per se. Instead, if
unspecified by the international law in
question, the scope of liability under the ATS
is appropriately classified as a question of
remedy to be settled under domestic law.
The plaintiffs in Kiobel I obtained a writ of
certiorari from the United States Supreme
Court. In its eventual opinion on the merits,
the Supreme Court described the case's rather
arduous path to and before it:

Judge Leval, Kiobel I's third panel member,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment
for the defendant, but sharply contesting the
majority's conception of liability under the
law of nations. He described “[i]nternational
law, at least as it pertains to human rights,” as
“a sparse body of norms ... prohibiting
conduct,” which lacks comprehensive rules
regarding liability and so “leaves the manner
of enforcement ... almost entirely to

The [United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York] dismissed
[several ATS] claims, reasoning that the facts
alleged to support those claims did not give
rise to a violation of the law of nations. The
court denied respondents' motion to dismiss
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with respect to the remaining claims, but
certified its order for interlocutory appeal [to
the Second Circuit] pursuant to § 1292(b).
The Second Circuit dismissed the entire
complaint, reasoning that the law of nations
does not recognize corporate liability. We
granted certiorari to consider that question.
After oral argument, we directed the parties
to file supplemental briefs addressing an
additional question: “Whether and under
what circumstances the [ATS] allows courts
to recognize a cause of action for violations
of the law of nations occurring within the
territory of a sovereign other than the United
States.” We heard oral argument again and
now affirm the judgment below, based on our
answer to the second question.

The Supreme Court chose to affirm Kiobel I
on extraterritoriality grounds without
reaching the corporate liability question. But
because both of these questions concern the
proper interpretation of the ATS itself, and
because the ATS is strictly jurisdictional, it
follows that both of these questions are
jurisdictional. Regarding corporate liability,
Kiobel I held that federal courts lack
jurisdiction over ATS suits against
corporations; as to extraterritoriality, Kiobel
II held that federal courts lack jurisdiction
over ATS suits based solely on
extraterritorial conduct unless that conduct
sufficiently touches and concerns the
territory of the United States. Taken together,
they require that if either the defendant in an
ATS suit is a corporation, or the ATS suit is
premised on conduct outside the United
States that does not sufficiently touch and
concern the territory of the United States, or
both, the federal court in which the suit was
brought lacks jurisdiction.

Thus, the Supreme Court first agreed to
review the judgment of this Court. After
being supplied with briefing and conducting
oral argument directed to the analysis we had
employed in Kiobel I, the Court decided to
address a different issue. The Court
concluded not that Kiobel I was right on the
law, but that it was right in its conclusion
because of the presumption against
extraterritoriality. The Court observed that
“all the relevant conduct took place outside
the United States,” which justified dismissal
of the plaintiffs' ATS claims.

Generally speaking, “this panel is bound by
prior decisions of this court unless and until
the precedents established therein are
reversed en banc or by the Supreme Court.”
We have recognized, though, that there is an
exception to this general rule when an
“intervening Supreme Court decision ... casts
doubt on our controlling precedent.” “[F]or
this exception to apply, the intervening
decision need not address the precise issue
already decided by our Court.” Instead, there
must be a conflict, incompatibility, or
“inconsisten[cy]” between this Circuit's
precedent and the intervening Supreme Court
decision. The effect of intervening precedent
may be “subtle,” but if the impact is
nonetheless “fundamental,” it requires this
Court to conclude that a decision of a panel
of this Court is “no longer good law.”

B. The Impact of Kiobel II on Kiobel I
Although the route the Supreme Court took
to its decision in Kiobel II seems to suggest
that the Court was less than satisfied with our
approach to jurisdiction over the cases on
appeal under the ATS, it neither said as much
nor purported to overrule Kiobel I. The two
decisions adopted different bases for
dismissal for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Whatever the tension between
them, the decisions are not logically
inconsistent.

Kiobel II does cast a shadow on Kiobel I in
several ways.
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First, in Kiobel II, the Supreme Court stated
that “[c]orporations are often present in many
countries, and it would reach too far to say
that mere corporate presence suffices” to
displace
the
presumption
against
extraterritorial application. The implication
of a statement that mere corporate presence is
insufficient would seem to be that corporate
presence may, in combination with some
other factual allegations, be sufficient—so
jurisdiction over ATS suits against
corporations is sometimes proper. Indeed, if
corporate liability under the ATS were not
possible as a general matter, the Supreme
Court's statement about “mere corporate
presence” would seem meaningless.
Accordingly, Kiobel II appears to suggest
that the ATS allows for some degree of
corporate liability.

Congress may have intended in passing the
statute. As Justice Breyer noted in his Kiobel
II concurrence, the basic purpose of the ATS
is to provide compensation to foreign
plaintiffs injured by “pirates,” “torturers,”
“perpetrators of genocide,” and similar
actors. Together, Kiobel I and Kiobel II put
such aggrieved potential plaintiffs in a very
small box: The two decisions read
cumulatively provide that plaintiffs can bring
ATS suits against only natural persons, and
perhaps non-corporate entities, based on
conduct that occurs at least in part within (or
otherwise sufficiently touches and concerns)
the territory of the United States. At a time
when large corporations are often among the
more important actors on the world stage, and
where actions and their effects frequently
cross international frontiers, Kiobel I and
Kiobel II may work together to prevent
foreign plaintiffs from having their day in
court in a far greater proportion of tort cases
than Congress envisioned when, centuries
ago, it passed the ATS.

Second, Kiobel II embraced an interpretation
of Sosa that seems to us to be more consistent
with Judge Leval's Kiobel I concurrence than
the majority opinion. According to the
Supreme Court, “[t]he question under Sosa ”
is “whether [a federal] court has authority to
recognize a cause of action under U.S. law to
enforce a norm of international law.” The
Supreme Court further stated that the ATS
empowers federal courts to recognize such a
cause of action “under federal common law”
to enable litigants to bring “private claims”
based on “international law violations.”
Kiobel II thus appears to reinforce Judge
Leval's reading of Sosa, which derives from
international law only the conduct
proscribed, leaving domestic law to govern
the available remedy and, presumably, the
nature of the party against whom it may be
obtained. If that is so, Kiobel II suggests that
Kiobel I relies in part on a misreading of
Sosa.

Our reading of Kiobel II is bolstered by what
appears to be a growing consensus among our
sister circuits that the ATS allows for
corporate liability. To date, the other circuits
to have considered the issue have all
determined that corporate liability is possible
under the ATS.
For those reasons, Kiobel II may be viewed
as an “intervening Supreme Court decision
that casts doubt on [Kiobel I ],” even though
it does not “address the precise issue” of
corporate liability. Kiobel II suggests a
reading of the ATS that is at best
“inconsistent” with Kiobel I 's core holding,
which along with the views of our sister
circuits indicates that something may be
wrong with Kiobel I.

Third, Kiobel I and Kiobel II may work in
tandem to narrow federal courts' jurisdiction
under the ATS more than what we understand

We nonetheless decline to conclude that
Kiobel II overruled Kiobel I. We think that
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one panel's overruling of the holding of a case
decided by a previous panel is perilous. It
tends, in our view, to degrade the expectation
of litigants, who routinely rely on the
authoritative stature of the Court's panel
opinions. It also diminishes respect for the
authority of three-judge panel decisions and
opinions by which the overwhelming
majority of our work, and that of other
circuits, is accomplished. We will leave it to
either an en banc sitting of this Court or an
eventual Supreme Court review to overrule
Kiobel I if, indeed, it is no longer viable.
If this Court declines to overrule Kiobel I
(either on the merits or by refusing to proceed
en banc), the Supreme Court would, of
course, be able to do so should it choose to
hear the case. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari on this issue in 2011 when it first
decided to hear an appeal from Kiobel I.
Having nonetheless avoided addressing the
issue directly in Kiobel II, perhaps it would
decide to grant certiorari on this issue
again—especially in light of the divergence
of federal case law since.

Kiobel I is the simplest, most direct route to
that result. By contrast, in order to affirm on
the grounds that law established by Kiobel II
prohibits the assumption of jurisdiction in
this case, we would have to decide in the first
instance that the alleged activities underlying
the plaintiffs' claims do not touch and
concern the United States sufficiently to
justify a conclusion that the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction under Kiobel II 's
extraterritoriality test. It seems to us to be
unwise to decide the difficult and sensitive
issue of whether the clearing of foreign
dollar-denominated payments through a
branch in New York could, under these
circumstances, displace the presumption
against the extraterritorial application of the
ATS, when it was not the focus of either the
district court's decision or the briefing on
appeal.
Moreover, deciding this appeal solely on the
basis of Kiobel I may well further the
development of the law of this Circuit in this
regard. If Kiobel I remains authoritative,
litigants would benefit from the settling of
expectations that clarification would bring.
And if the rule of Kiobel I does not prevail,
then leaving it unnecessarily “on the books”
is worrisome—it may result in the dismissal
of cases that are meritorious, including
possibly multidistrict litigations that are
randomly assigned to the district courts in
this Circuit. Perhaps more insidiously,
plaintiffs with ATS claims against
corporations that turn out to be permissible
might well be dissuaded from asserting them
in this Circuit despite their ultimate merit.
We therefore affirm on the basis of the
holding of Kiobel I.

Finally, the district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' ATS claims solely on corporate
liability grounds under Kiobel I. It is well
settled that “we may affirm on any grounds
for which there is a record sufficient to permit
conclusions of law, including grounds not
relied upon by the district court.” However,
we have discretion to choose not to do so
based on prudential factors and concerns.
It is tempting to seek to avoid grappling with
issues requiring an analysis of the
relationship between Kiobel I and Kiobel II
and the continuing viability of Kiobel I
simply by affirming the district court's
judgments on the basis of Kiobel II alone. We
nevertheless decline to do so for several
reasons. First, inasmuch as the district court
did decide the case based solely on a
mechanical application of Kiobel I, if it is
“good law,” an affirmance on the basis of

III. Common Law Claims
The plaintiffs request that if we affirm the
dismissal of their ATS claims—as indeed we
do—we reinstate the “general federal
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common law” claims asserted in their
complaints (to which they refer on appeal as
their “general common-law tort” claims),
which the district court dismissed as
redundant and lacking a “sound basis.”
Alternatively, the plaintiffs request leave to
amend their complaints in order to re-plead
under state or foreign law the claims that they
originally pleaded under federal common
law. We decline both requests.

notice of specific state or foreign commonlaw claims that it might be called upon to
defend against in this litigation. The plaintiffs
have had ample time to develop and assert
such theories. The district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying leave to amend
because permitting the plaintiffs to repackage
their federal common-law claims as state or
foreign common-law claims at such a late
stage would, we think, do a disservice both to
the courts in which they chose to litigate their
claims, and to the defendant, which must
prepare itself to defend against them.

First, we will not reinstate the plaintiffs'
federal common-law causes of action
because we discern no basis for such
nebulous, non-statutory claims under federal
law.

Permitting the plaintiffs in Jesner, Lev, and
Agurenko to amend their complaints would,
moreover, have been futile. Following the
dismissal of the plaintiffs' ATS claims, the
only basis on which the district court might
exercise jurisdiction over these actions would
be diversity of citizenship. But “diversity is
lacking ... where the only parties are foreign
entities, or where on one side there are
citizens and aliens and on the opposite side
there are only aliens.” Here, there are aliens
on both sides of the litigation—plaintiffs are
aliens (only aliens can bring ATS claims),
and so is the defendant, a citizen of Jordan—
and the Jesner, Lev, and Agurenko plaintiffs
do not seek to assert any other federal claims
that might provide a basis for federalquestion jurisdiction. For these reasons,
permitting the Jesner, Lev, and Agurenko
plaintiffs to amend their complaints to assert
non-federal common-law claims would be
fruitless.

As for leave to amend the complaints, “we
review [the district court's refusal to allow
such amendment] only for abuse of discretion
which ordinarily we will not identify absent
an error of law, a clearly erroneous
assessment of the facts, or a decision outside
the available range of permitted choices.”
While “[l]eave to amend should be freely
granted, ... the district court has the discretion
to deny leave if there [was] a good reason for
it, such as futility, bad faith, undue delay, or
undue prejudice to the opposing party
The plaintiffs have spent more than ten years
litigating the matters before us but have not
specified any particular state or foreign
common-law theory on which they seek to
recover. To be sure, they have in their
complaints and in their briefing on appeal
asserted that they may recover under general
principles of joint-venture liability, agency,
reckless disregard, intentional injury of
others by a third party, reckless disregard,
wrongful death, survival, and negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
But their short and conclusory statements to
this effect, untethered to the law of any
particular jurisdiction or any serious attempt
at explanation, did not put the defendant on

The district court therefore acted within its
discretion in declining to permit the plaintiffs
to amend their complaints.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the
judgments of the district court.
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“Supreme Court to Weigh if Firms Can Be Sued in Human Rights
Cases”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
April 3, 2017

The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to
decide whether corporations may be sued in
American courts for complicity in human
rights abuses abroad.

The federal appeals courts are divided over
whether corporations may be sued under the
law.
The Supreme Court had agreed to decide the
question once before, in 2011, in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum. The Obama
administration urged the court to rule that
corporations could be subject to the law.

The case concerns Arab Bank, which is based
in Jordan and has been accused of processing
financial transactions through a branch in
New York for groups linked to terrorism. The
plaintiffs in the case seek to hold the bank
liable for attacks in Israel and in the
Palestinian territories by Hamas and other
groups.

After hearing arguments on the question in
2012, the Supreme Court asked the parties to
brief and argue a broader issue: whether
American courts may ever hear disputes
under the law for human rights abuses
abroad, whether the defendant was a
corporation or not.

The case turns on the meaning of the Alien
Tort Statute, a cryptic 1789 law that allows
federal district courts to hear “any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.”

In 2013, the court said that there was a
general
presumption
against
the
extraterritorial application of American law,
ruling against Nigerian plaintiffs who said
foreign oil companies had aided in atrocities
by Nigerian military and police forces against
Ogoni villagers.

The law was largely ignored until the 1980s,
when federal courts started to apply it in
international human rights cases. A 2004
Supreme Court decision, Sosa v. ÁlvarezMachain, left the door open to some claims
under the law, as long as they involved
violations of international norms with
“definite content and acceptance among
civilized nations.”

Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., writing for
the majority, wrote that even minimal contact
with the United States would not be sufficient
to overcome the presumption. “Even where
the claims touch and concern the territory of
the United States, they must do so with
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sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritorial application,” he wrote.
But the Supreme Court did not answer the
question it had initially agreed to consider,
whether corporations are categorically
excluded from the law.
The new case, Jesner v. Arab Bank, No. 16499, is likely to produce an answer. It is an
appeal from a decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
New York, which ruled in favor of Arab
Bank, saying that corporations may not be
sued under the 1789 law.
The plaintiffs in the case said the bank had
“served as the ‘paymaster’ for Hamas and
other terrorist organizations, helping them
identify and pay the families of suicide
bombers and other terrorists.”
The bank responded that it had helped the
United States in “the fight against terrorism
financing and money laundering” and was
not accused by the plaintiffs of being
“involved in the planning, financing or
commission of the attacks that caused their
injuries.”
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“DOJ’s curious Supreme Court brief in Arab Bank Alien Tort case”
Reuters
Alison Frankel
June 29, 2017

It’s always fascinating to see how the U.S.
solicitor general’s office attempts to
reconcile
competing
executive-branch
interests when it files briefs in U.S. Supreme
Court litigation affecting the government’s
relationships with foreign sovereigns.

Dutch Petroleum. The Justice Department,
siding with the Nigerian plaintiffs in the
Royal Dutch case, submitted a brief arguing
that the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
was wrong to hold that corporations cannot
be sued under the ATS. It urged the Supreme
Court to reverse the 2nd Circuit and rule that
corporations can be liable.

The latest example is the Justice
Department’s brief in a dispute over whether
about 6,000 non-U.S. citizens can use a 1798
law to sue Jordan’s biggest financial
institution, Arab Bank, for allegedly
facilitating terrorism. The brief preserves the
integrity of the solicitor general’s office by
repeating arguments the Justice Department
made in a 2012 Supreme Court case that
raised the exact same question as the Arab
Bank case. But the filing also reflects the U.S.
State Department’s concerns about alienating
an important ally.

Instead, the Supreme Court changed its mind
about what the real issue in the case was. The
justices called for additional briefing about
whether the ATS extends to conduct outside
of U.S. borders. The court’s 2013 Kiobel
decision held that the ATS presumptively
does not apply to overseas conduct but
plaintiffs can rebut the presumption by
showing “with sufficient force” that their
claims “touch and concern the territory of the
United States.”
The Supreme Court’s Kiobel decision did not
directly address whether corporations can be
sued so the 2nd Circuit’s Kiobel ruling
remained intact, as the non-U.S. plaintiffs
trying to sue Arab Bank discovered to their
detriment in 2015. The plaintiffs, all of whom
blame the Jordanian bank for allowing
Hamas to finance international terror attacks,
moved to revive dismissed ATS claims after
the Supreme Court’s Kiobel decision. A
three-judge 2nd Circuit panel said they still
couldn’t sue the bank because Kiobel was

That awkward balance could be an
opportunity for Arab Bank to get the
Supreme Court to look at a second issue in a
case the bank is otherwise almost certain to
lose.
The Supreme Court granted review of the
case, Jesner v. Arab Bank, to decide whether
the Alien Tort Statute can be asserted against
corporations. If that question sounds familiar,
it’s because the justices agreed to hear the
same issue back in 2011, in Kiobel v. Royal
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still binding 2nd Circuit precedent, and under
that precedent, plaintiffs can’t assert the ATS
against corporations. In 2016, a splintered en
banc 2nd Circuit declined to hear the Arab
Bank ATS case.

is doomed. Even Arab Bank, represented at
the Supreme Court by Paul Clement of
Kirkland & Ellis, didn’t try very hard in its
brief opposing Supreme Court review to
justify the legal reasoning of the 2nd Circuit’s
Kiobel precedent, though the brief halfheartedly mentioned the U.N. Council on
Human Rights “has recognized that
international law does not currently impose
any direct legal responsibilities on
corporations.”

In the plaintiffs’ June 20 merits brief, their
Supreme Court counsel, Jeffrey Fisher of
Stanford’s Supreme Court Litigation Clinic,
argued that the 2nd Circuit’s prohibition on
ATS suits against corporations is the result of
a misread footnote in a Supreme Court case
that only discussed actionable conduct under
the ATS, not liability. There’s nothing in the
text of the ancient statute, which was
supposed to address piracy on the high seas,
or in its long history to indicate corporations
are exempt when they violate international
norms, the brief said.

But the second half of the Justice Department
brief may keep the Arab Bank case from
being completely lopsided – if Arab Bank can
leverage it to persuade the justices to look
beyond the narrow question of corporate
liability under the Alien Tort Statute.
The Justice Department’s brief didn’t stop at
that question. It went on to address whether
the non-U.S. plaintiffs suing Arab Bank can
rebut the presumption against overseas
application of the ATS, as the Supreme Court
said they must in that 2013 Kiobel ruling.
According to the Justice Department, nonU.S. plaintiffs can’t overcome the
presumption just by arguing that foreign
banks used automated systems to clear U.S.
dollar transactions through banks in the U.S.

“A business should not be allowed to reap the
benefits of incorporation while claiming
immunity from liability for noxious acts such
as terrorism, slavery, or genocide,” Fisher
wrote.
The Justice Department’s brief, posted
Wednesday on the SG’s website, completely
backed the plaintiffs’ interpretation – and
Justice’s own previous analysis from Kiobel
– of corporate liability under the ATS.
(DOJ’s brief was signed by Deputy Solicitor
General Edwin Kneedler because Acting SG
Jeffrey Wall is recused.) No other federal
circuit has adopted the 2nd Circuit’s bar on
suing corporations under the ATS, the Justice
Department pointed out, and “nothing in
international law discountenances civil
claims against corporations.”

“Automated clearance activities alone would
not support claims under the ATS,” the
Justice brief said. “A foreign actor’s
preference
for
dollar-denominated
transactions, and the consequent likelihood
that a transaction will be automatically routed
through a bank’s U.S. branch or affiliate, are
not generally circumstances for which the
international community might validly deem
the United States to be responsible. Congress
did not intend the ATS to ‘make the United

By my read, the 2nd Circuit’s Kiobel
prohibition on ATS suits against corporations
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States a uniquely hospitable forum for the
enforcement of international norms.’ That
limitation is difficult to reconcile with an
approach under which a claim under the ATS
may be premised on the popularity of the
dollar as a currency for remunerating foreign
illegal activity.”

as mere banking services can give rise to ATS
liability. That’s a potentially more difficult
question than the 2nd Circuit’s bar on ATS
suits against corporations. Global banks have
already been spooked by a Brooklyn federal
jury verdict holding Arab Bank liable to U.S.
citizens in a terror financing suit that parallels
the case at the Supreme Court. If the justices
decide they’re interested in dollar-clearing
transactions and territoriality, international
banks will be watching intently.

The Justice Department conceded that our
own government has been known to base
criminal and forfeiture actions on “foreign
misuse
of
domestic
(banking)
instrumentalities,” but said the rules are
different for private plaintiffs asserting the
ATS. That’s especially true, the brief said,
when foreign policy is implicated, as it is in
the Arab Bank case, which has already frayed
the government’s relationship with a crucial
friend in military operations against the
Islamic State.

That’s unlikely to happen, of course. The
plaintiffs suing Arab Bank described in detail
their evidence that the bank wasn’t just
processing transactions by rote but was
facilitating money transfers for known
Hamas leaders. There’s every reason for the
justices to wait for a different case to test the
jurisdictional power of dollar-clearing
transactions in suits by private citizens.

The Justice Department did not call on the
Supreme Court to expand the Arab Bank case
to include whether dollar-clearing is
sufficient to provide the requisite “touch and
concern” with U.S. territory. It also noted that
plaintiffs have alleged more than dollarclearing against Arab Bank, and that those
additional assertions could justify reviving
the ATS suit.

But Kiobel’s history at the Supreme Court
shows that anything can happen. The justices
already changed their focus in one ATS case.
Who says they won’t do it again?

The brief asked the Supreme Court to instruct
the 2nd Circuit to decide whether the Arab
Bank plaintiffs meet the territorial test for an
ATS suit – an issue the 2nd Circuit pointedly
avoided when it said the case couldn’t be
brought because Arab Bank is a corporation.
The big question now is whether Arab Bank,
in its response brief, will push for the
Supreme Court to go even farther and decide
whether what the bank has always described
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“Plaintiffs Petition U.S. Supreme Court in High-Profile Alien Tort
Statute Case”
Lexology
Emily Holland
November 2, 2016

Plaintiffs in Jesner v. Arab Bank have sought
certiorari from the United States Supreme
Court requesting that the Court take up, and
answer, the unresolved question of whether
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) permits
corporate liability for violations of the law of
nations. Seeking certiorari does not ensure
that the Supreme Court will agree to hear the
case—the Court agrees to hear only a small
fraction of the cases submitted to it for
review. In this case, however, the chances of
review are somewhat increased because: (i)
there is currently a split between the various
Courts of Appeal on the question of whether
corporate liability is possible in a claim
brought under the ATS, and (ii) because the
Second Circuit, which decided Jesner,
specifically noted that the issue could benefit
from the Supreme Court’s review.

facilitating the activities of Hamas, which the
United States has labelled a terrorist
organization. (Arab Bank previously settled
claims brought on the basis of the same
conduct by plaintiffs under the U.S. AntiTerrorism Act, which allows U.S. citizens to
pursue claims arising from international
terrorism, having lost its bid to avoid liability
in court.)
With respect to the ATS claims, the Second
Circuit ruled for Arab Bank. The Second
Circuit applied an earlier Second Circuit
decision and held that ATS does not permit
claims against corporations. That case,
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, went to the
Supreme Court, which ultimately decided the
case on different grounds, finding that the
presumption
against
extraterritorial
application of U.S. law bars ATS claims that
lack a sufficient connection to the United
States. In rejecting the possibility that the
claims presented in Kiobel had sufficient
connections to the United States to permit
them to go forward, the Court ruled that “it
would reach too far to say” that [a
defendant’s] mere corporate presence [in the
United States] suffices.”

Briefly, plaintiffs sued Arab Bank, which is
one of the largest financial institutions in
Jordan, several years ago alleging a variety of
claims, including some under the ATS. The
plaintiffs, U.S. and foreign nationals who
were injured, or whose family members were
killed or injured in certain terrorist attacks
carried out in Israel, seek to hold the bank
responsible for allegedly financing and
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Back to Jesner, Arab Bank’s opposition is
due on November 12. The petitioners have
consented to any and all amicus briefs, and
we expect at least one from Arab Bank.

The question the Jesner plaintiffs,
represented by Stanford Law School and two
law firms, now ask the Court to address is the
question left unanswered in Kiobel: whether
a corporation, as opposed to a natural person,
can be found liable under the ATS. The
certiorari petition notes that several Courts of
Appeal—by a margin of, according to the
petition, “four to one”—have decided that the
ATS permits corporate liability. Plaintiffs
also argue that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Kiobelsuggests (or appears to suggest) that
the ATS contemplates corporate liability.
The petition disputes what it describes as the
Second Circuit’s outlier position that,
following Kiobel’sintroduction of the “touch
and concern” test, the issue of whether the
ATS allows corporate liability will “rarely”
matter. In support, and among other
arguments, the petition points to another case
currently making its way through the Second
Circuit, involving terror financing allegations
against another financial institution.
In that case, Licci v. Lebanese Canadian
Bank, the Second Circuit concluded that
plaintiffs’ ATS claims had “surpassed
[Kiobel’s] jurisdictional hurdle,” since the
conduct alleged touched and concerned the
United States with the requisite “sufficient
force” necessary to survive dismissal, and
had stated a claim for a violation of the law
of nations. Specifically, the court pointed to
the bank’s use of a correspondent banking
account in New York to facilitate wire
transfers to a terrorist organization that
enabled and facilitated terrorist rocket attacks
harming or killing plaintiffs and their
decedents. Ultimately, however, the court
determined that the circuit’s bar on corporate
liability under the ATS foreclosed the claims.
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“Corporate Liability and the ATS: Arab Bank Appeal Continues to
Define Kiobel Legacy”
Lawfare Blog
Sarah Freuden, Alex Zerden
December 16, 2015

At a time of heightened concern over a new
wave of terrorism financing threats, the
decade-long Arab Bank terrorism financing
litigation took another turn last week when
the Second Circuit denied several thousand
terrorism victims the right to pursue claims
against the Jordan-based Arab Bank PLC in
U.S. federal court. The plaintiffs are non-U.S.
victims of Palestinian terrorism from the
Second Intifada from 2000-2004 who sued
Arab Bank under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) for alleged financing and facilitation
of terrorist organization activities. The
Second Circuit’s decision comes at a time
when courts across the country are grappling
with broader issues of how to handle complex
substantive and jurisdictional questions
involving
foreign
companies
and
extraterritorial conduct.

Bank. However, all is not lost for the
plaintiffs; the panel also recognized that
Kiobel I “appears to swim alone against the
tide” of sister circuits, which allow for
corporate liability under the ATS, and
welcomed en banc or Supreme Court review.
Plaintiffs’ counsel is also contemplating an
appeal.
The ATS is an eighteenth century law that
permits foreign plaintiffs to bring suit in
federal court for torts “committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.” After laying dormant for much of its
existence, the ATS has been used in recent
decades to pursue claims against individuals
and corporations around the world for human
rights violations. The Supreme Court,
however, has approached the ATS with some
skepticism, and has reined in the use of the
statute considerably in recent years. In the
seminal ATS case Sosa v. Alvarez Machain,
542 U.S. 692 (2004), the Supreme Court held
that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute, which
grants jurisdiction over violations of only
those international norms that are binding,
specific, and universally accepted, such as
piracy and torture.

Last Tuesday, a three-judge panel of the
Second Circuit issued a ruling that addressed
the narrow but critical issue whether the ATS
applies to corporations. Citing the Court’s
2010 decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010)
(Kiobel I), affʹd on other grounds, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013) (Kiobel II), the panel held that it does
not, and therefore affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of these claims against the Arab

Kiobel I, the Second Circuit decision on
which Tuesday’s Arab Bank ruling is based,
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purported to apply Sosa. The majority
opinion, authored by Judge Cabranes, held
that corporations are not subject to liability
under the ATS, because the concept of
corporate liability has not attained “universal
acceptance” in international law. Yet all other
Circuits that have addressed the issue have
disagreed, assuming or deciding that the ATS
permits corporate liability under certain
circumstances. This includes the Ninth, D.C.,
Seventh, Eleventh, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits.
Judge Leval likewise came to that conclusion
in Kiobel I, reasoning in his concurring
opinion that “international law takes no
position” on whether civil liability should be
imposed on particular actors, such as
corporations, but “leaves that question to
each nation to resolve.”

Nabisco, concerning the proper application
of the presumption against extraterritoriality
under RICO. It will be important to watch
how the Supreme Court rules in that case, and
whether its decision applies beyond the
context of RICO.
As for corporate liability under the ATS, the
issue remains unresolved. The lack of an
outright rejection by the Supreme Court may
indicate that such liability is theoretically
possible, and some language in Kiobel II
appears to specifically contemplate corporate
liability. The Second Circuit acknowledged
as much in the Arab Bank decision, noting
that “Kiobel II suggests a reading of the ATS
that is at best ‘inconsistent’ with Kiobel I’s
core holding.” That, combined with the
opposite conclusions of several Circuit
Courts indicates that there may be
“something wrong” with Kiobel I. Yet the
Second Circuit “declined to conclude” that
Kiobel II overruled Kiobel I, reasoning it
would be preferable to have the issue
resolved en banc and/or through further
review by the Supreme Court. Therefore, for
the moment at least, corporations may be not
sued under the ATS in the Second Circuit.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Kiobel on the issue of corporate liability, but
instead applied the presumption against
extraterritoriality and ruled that the case was
not actionable, because the alleged violations
did not sufficiently “touch and concern” the
United States. The ATS is a statute
specifically designed to address wrongs
committed against non-U.S. nationals, so
application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality significantly narrows that
the scope of actionable claims. Moreover, the
Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of the
presumption against extraterritoriality in
Kiobel II and Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010), has had, and will
continue to have, a resounding impact not
only on the viability of ATS cases, but on the
viability of all cases involving non-U.S.
actors and conduct. The Supreme Court
recently granted certiorari in another Second
Circuit case, European Community v. RJR

More broadly, beyond the ATS, the Arab
Bank case exists in a complex legal, policy,
and diplomatic space. Along with the nonU.S. ATS victims, nearly 500 American
plaintiffs sued under a separate statute, the
Anti-Terrorism Act, and are engaged in
ongoing settlement negotiations with the
Arab Bank after achieving a federal jury
verdict against the bank in September 2014
and the announcement of a settlement
framework on the heels of the damages trial
in August 2015. The case has also provoked
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a spirited interagency debate pitting the State
Department against the Treasury and Justice
Departments that implicates diplomatic
relations with Jordan and the Palestinian
Authority.
Ultimately, another court will have to decide
if corporations can be sued under the ATS.
However, this Arab Bank decision nudges the
issue forward for future resolution and serves
as another example to consider when
weighing how to address foreign companies
and extraterritorial conduct under U.S. law.
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National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.
16-307
Ruling Below: Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013 (C.A.5, 2015)
Employer filed petition for review of order of the National Labor Relations Board, 361 NLRB
No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454, finding that it had unlawfully required employees to sign arbitration
agreement waiving their right to pursue class and collective actions. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge, granted in part and denied in part.
Question Presented: Whether arbitration agreements with individual employees that bar them
from pursuing work-related claims on a collective or class basis in any forum are prohibited as
an unfair labor practice under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), because they limit the employees' right
under the National Labor Relations Act to engage in “concerted activities” in pursuit of their
“mutual aid or protection,” 29 U.S.C. § 157, and are therefore unenforceable under the savings
clause of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2.

MURPHY OIL USA, INCORPORATED, Petitioner/Cross–Respondent
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent/Cross–Petitioner.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Decided on October 26, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judge:

prior ruling. We GRANT Murphy Oil's
petition, and hold that the corporation did not
commit unfair labor practices by requiring
employees to sign its arbitration agreement or
seeking to enforce that agreement in federal
district court.

The National Labor Relations Board
concluded that Murphy Oil USA, Inc., had
unlawfully required employees at its
Alabama facility to sign an arbitration
agreement waiving their right to pursue class
and collective actions. Murphy Oil, aware
that this circuit had already held to the
contrary, used the broad venue rights
governing the review of Board orders to file
its petition with this circuit. The Board, also
aware, moved for en banc review in order to
allow arguments that the prior decision
should be overturned. Having failed in that
motion and having the case instead heard by
a three-judge panel, the Board will not be
surprised that we adhere, as we must, to our

We DENY Murphy Oil's petition insofar as
the Board's order directed the corporation to
clarify language in its arbitration agreement
applicable to employees hired prior to March
2012 to ensure they understand they are not
barred from filing charges with the Board.
FACTS
AND
PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., operates retail gas
stations in several states. Sheila Hobson, the
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charging party, began working for Murphy
Oil at its Calera, Alabama facility in
November 2008. She signed a “Binding
Arbitration Agreement and Waiver of Jury
Trial” (the “Arbitration Agreement”). The
Arbitration Agreement provides that,
“[e]xcluding claims which must, by ... law,
be resolved in other forums, [Murphy Oil]
and Individual agree to resolve any and all
disputes or claims ... which relate ... to
Individual's employment ... by binding
arbitration.” The Arbitration Agreement
further requires employees to waive the right
to pursue class or collective claims in an
arbitral or judicial forum.

requiring employees to sign an arbitration
agreement waiving their right to pursue class
and collective claims in all forums. D.R.
Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184 (2012). The
Board concluded that such agreements
restrict employees' Section 7 right to engage
in protected concerted activity in violation of
Section 8(a)(1). Id. The Board also held that
employees could reasonably construe the
language in the D.R. Horton arbitration
agreement to preclude employees from filing
an unfair labor practice charge, which also
violates Section 8(a)(1).
Following the Board's decision in D.R.
Horton, Murphy Oil implemented a “Revised
Arbitration Agreement” for all employees
hired after March 2012. The revision
provided that employees were not barred
from “participating in proceedings to
adjudicate unfair labor practice[ ] charges
before the” Board. Because Hobson and the
other employees involved in the Alabama
lawsuit were hired before March 2012, the
revision did not apply to them.

In June 2010, Hobson and three other
employees filed a collective action against
Murphy Oil in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama
alleging violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”). Murphy Oil moved
to dismiss the collective action and compel
individual arbitration pursuant to the
Arbitration Agreement. The employees
opposed the motion, contending that the
FLSA prevented enforcement of the
Arbitration Agreement because that statute
grants a substantive right to collective action
that cannot be waived. The employees also
argued that the Arbitration Agreement
interfered with their right under the National
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) to engage in
Section 7 protected concerted activity.
While Murphy Oil's motion to dismiss was
pending, Hobson filed an unfair labor charge
with the Board in January 2011 based on the
claim that the Arbitration Agreement
interfered with her Section 7 rights under the
NLRA. The General Counsel for the Board
issued a complaint and notice of hearing to
Murphy Oil in March 2011.

In September 2012, the Alabama district
court stayed the FLSA collective action and
compelled the employees to submit their
claims to arbitration pursuant to the
Arbitration Agreement. One month later, the
General Counsel amended the complaint
before the Board stemming from Hobson's
charge to allege that Murphy Oil's motion to
dismiss and compel arbitration in the
Alabama lawsuit violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the NLRA.
Meanwhile, the petition for review of the
Board's decision in D.R. Horton was making
its way to this court. In December 2013, we
rejected the Board's analysis of arbitration
agreements. We held: (1) the NLRA does not
contain
a
“congressional
command
overriding” the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”); and (2) “use of class action

In a separate case of first impression, the
Board held in January 2012 that an employer
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by
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procedures ... is not a substantive right” under
Section 7 of the NLRA. This holding means
an employer does not engage in unfair labor
practices by maintaining and enforcing an
arbitration agreement prohibiting employee
class or collective actions and requiring
employment-related claims to be resolved
through individual arbitration.

incurred in opposing the company's motion to
dismiss and compel arbitration in the
Alabama litigation, and file a sworn
declaration outlining the steps it had taken to
comply with the Board order.

In analyzing the specific arbitration
agreement at issue in D.R. Horton, however,
we held that its language could be
“misconstrued” as prohibiting employees
from filing an unfair labor practice charge,
which would violate Section 8(a)(1). We
enforced the Board's order requiring the
employer to clarify the agreement. The Board
petitioned for rehearing en banc, which was
denied without a poll in April 2014.

DISCUSSION

Murphy Oil timely petitioned this court for
review of the Board decision.

Board decisions that are “reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole” are upheld.
“Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind would accept
to support a conclusion.” This court reviews
the Board's legal conclusions de novo, but
“[w]e will enforce the Board's order if its
construction of the statute is reasonably
defensible.”

The Board's decision as to Murphy Oil was
issued in October 2014, ten months after our
initial D.R. Horton decision and six months
after rehearing was denied. The Board,
unpersuaded by our analysis, reaffirmed its
D.R. Horton decision. It held that Murphy Oil
violated Section 8(a)(1) by “requiring its
employees to agree to resolve all
employment-related
claims
through
individual arbitration, and by taking steps to
enforce the unlawful agreements in [f]ederal
district court.” The Board also held that both
the Arbitration Agreement and Revised
Arbitration Agreement were unlawful
because employees would reasonably
construe them to prohibit filing Board
charges.

I. Statute of Limitations and Collateral
Estoppel
Murphy Oil asserts that Hobson filed her
charge too late after the execution of the
Arbitration Agreement and the submission of
Murphy Oil's motion to compel in the
Alabama litigation. By statute, “no complaint
shall issue based upon any unfair labor
practice occurring more than six months prior
to the filing of the charge with the Board.”
Murphy Oil also contends that the Board is
collaterally estopped from considering
whether it was lawful to enforce the
Arbitration Agreement because the district
court had already decided that issue in the
Alabama litigation.

The Board ordered numerous remedies.
Murphy Oil was required to rescind or revise
the Arbitration and Revised Arbitration
agreements, send notification of the
rescission or revision to signatories and to the
Alabama district court, post a notice
regarding the violation at its facilities,
reimburse the employees' attorneys' fees

Both of these arguments were raised in
Murphy Oil's answer to the Board's
complaint. They were not, though, discussed
in its brief before the Board. “No objection
that has not been urged before the Board ...
shall be considered by the court....” Similarly,
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we have held that “[a]ppellate preservation
principles apply equally to petitions for
enforcement or review of NLRB decisions.”
While Murphy Oil may have properly pled its
statute of limitations and collateral estoppel
defenses, it did not sufficiently press those
arguments before the Board. Thus, they are
waived.

place, (2) any circuit in which Murphy Oil
transacts business, or (3) the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. The Board may well not know
which circuit's law will be applied on a
petition for review. We do not celebrate the
Board's failure to follow our D.R. Horton
reasoning, but neither do we condemn its
nonacquiescence.

II. D.R. Horton and Board Nonacquiescence
III. The Agreements and NLRA Section
8(a)(1)

The Board, reaffirming its D.R. Horton
analysis, held that Murphy Oil violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by enforcing
agreements that “requir [ed] ... employees to
agree to resolve all employment-related
claims through individual arbitration.” In
doing so, of course, the Board disregarded
this court's contrary D.R. Horton ruling that
such arbitration agreements are enforceable
and not unlawful. Our decision was issued
not quite two years ago; we will not repeat its
analysis here. Murphy Oil committed no
unfair labor practice by requiring employees
to relinquish their right to pursue class or
collective claims in all forums by signing the
arbitration agreements at issue here.

The Board also held that Murphy Oil's
enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement
and Revised Arbitration Agreement violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA because
employees could reasonably believe the
contracts precluded the filing of Board
charges. Hobson and the other employees
involved in the Alabama litigation were
subject to the Arbitration Agreement
applicable to employees hired before March
2012. The Revised Arbitration Agreement
contains language that sought to correct the
possible ambiguity.
A. The Arbitration Agreement in Effect
Before March 2012

Murphy Oil argues that the Board's explicit
“defiance” of D.R. Horton warrants issuing a
writ or holding the Board in contempt so as
to “restrain [it] from continuing its
nonacquiescence practice with respect to this
[c]ourt's directive.” The Board, as far as we
know, has not failed to apply our ruling in
D.R. Horton to the parties in that case. The
concern here is the application of D.R.
Horton to new parties and agreements.

Section 8(a) of the NLRA makes it unlawful
for an employer to commit unfair labor
practices. For example, an employer is
prohibited from interfering with employees'
exercise of their Section 7 rights. Under
Section 7, employees have the right to selforganize and “engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”
The Board is empowered to prevent unfair
labor practices. This power cannot be limited
by an agreement between employees and the
employer. “Wherever private contracts
conflict with [the Board's] functions, they ...
must yield or the [NLRA] would be reduced
to a futility.” Accordingly, as we held in D.R.

An administrative agency's need to acquiesce
to an earlier circuit court decision when
deciding similar issues in later cases will be
affected by whether the new decision will be
reviewed in that same circuit. Murphy Oil
could have sought review in (1) the circuit
where the unfair labor practice allegedly took
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Horton, an arbitration agreement violates the
NLRA if employees would reasonably
construe it as prohibiting filing unfair labor
practice charges with the Board.

employment arbitration agreement is lawful.
Such a provision would assist, though, if
incompatible or confusing language appears
in the contract.

Murphy Oil argues that Hobson's choice to
file a charge with the Board proves that the
pre-March 2012 Arbitration Agreement did
not state or suggest such charges could not be
filed. The argument misconstrues the
question. “[T]he actual practice of employees
is not determinative” of whether an employer
has committed an unfair labor practice. The
Board has said that the test is whether the
employer action is “likely to have a chilling
effect” on employees' exercise of their rights.
The possibility that employees will
misunderstand their rights was a reason we
upheld the Board's rejection of a similar
provision of the arbitration agreement in D.R.
Horton. We explained that the FAA and
NLRA have “equal importance in our
review” of employment arbitration contracts.
We held that even though requiring
arbitration of class or collective claims in all
forums does not “deny a party any statutory
right,” an agreement reasonably interpreted
as prohibiting the filing of unfair labor
charges would unlawfully deny employees
their rights under the NLRA.

We conclude that the Arbitration Agreement
in effect for employees hired before March
2012, including Hobson and the others
involved in the Alabama case, violates the
NLRA. The Board's order that Murphy Oil
take corrective action as to any employees
that remain subject to that version of the
contract is valid.
B. The Revised Arbitration Agreement in
Effect After March 2012
In March 2012, following the Board's
decision in D.R. Horton, Murphy Oil added
the following clause in the Revised
Arbitration Agreement: “[N]othing in this
Agreement precludes [employees] ... from
participating in proceedings to adjudicate
unfair labor practice[ ] charges before the
[Board].” The Board contends that Murphy
Oil's modification is also unlawful because it
“leaves intact the entirety of the original
Agreement” including employees' waiver of
their right “to commence or be a party to any
group, class or collective action claim in ...
any other forum.” This provision, the Board
said, could be reasonably interpreted as
prohibiting employees from pursuing an
administrative remedy “since such a claim
could be construed as having ‘commence[d]’
a class action in the event that the [Board]
decides to seek classwide relief.”

Murphy Oil's Arbitration Agreement
provided that “any and all disputes or claims
[employees] may have ... which relate in any
manner ... to ... employment” must be
resolved
by
individual
arbitration.
Signatories further “waive their right to ... be
a party to any group, class or collective action
claim in ... any other forum.” The problem is
that broad “any claims” language can create
“[t]he reasonable impression ... that an
employee is waiving not just [her] trial rights,
but [her] administrative rights as well.”
We do not hold that an express statement
must be made that an employee's right to file
Board charges remains intact before an

We disagree with the Board. Reading the
Murphy Oil contract as a whole, it would be
unreasonable for an employee to construe the
Revised
Arbitration
Agreement
as
prohibiting the filing of Board charges when
the agreement says the opposite. The other
clauses of the agreement do not negate that
language. We decline to enforce the Board's
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order as to
Agreement.

the

Revised

Arbitration

response, the restaurant filed a lawsuit in
state court against the demonstrators alleging
that they had blocked access to the restaurant,
created a threat to public safety, and made
libelous statements about the business and its
management. The waitress filed a second
charge with the Board alleging that the
restaurant initiated the civil suit in retaliation
for employees' engaging in Section 7
protected concerted activity, which violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the NLRA.

IV. Murphy Oil's Motion to Dismiss and
NLRA Section 8(a)(1)
Finally, the Board held that Murphy Oil
violated Section 8(a)(1) by filing its motion
to dismiss and compel arbitration in the
Alabama litigation. As noted above, Section
8(a) prohibits employers from engaging in
unfair labor practices. Section 8(a)(1)
provides that an employer commits an unfair
labor practice by “interfer[ing] with,
restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in the
exercise” of their Section 7 rights, including
engaging in protected concerted activity.

The Board held that the restaurant's lawsuit
constituted an unfair labor practice because it
was filed for the purpose of discouraging
employees from seeking relief with the
Board. The Supreme Court remanded the
case for further consideration, stating: “The
right to litigate is an important one,” but it can
be “used by an employer as a powerful
instrument of coercion or retaliation.” To be
enjoinable, the Court said the lawsuit
prosecuted by the employer must (1) be
“baseless” or “lack[ing] a reasonable basis in
fact or law,” and be filed “with the intent of
retaliating against an employee for the
exercise of rights protected by” Section 7, or
(2) have “an objective that is illegal under
federal law.”

The Board said that in filing its dispositive
motion and “eight separate court pleadings
and related [documents] ... between
September 2010 and February 2012,”
Murphy Oil “acted with an illegal objective
[in].... ‘seeking to enforce an unlawful
contract provision’ ” that would chill
employees' Section 7 rights, and awarded
attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in
“opposing the ... unlawful motion.” We
disagree and decline to enforce the fees
award.

We start by distinguishing this dispute from
that in Bill Johnson's. The current
controversy began when three Murphy Oil
employees filed suit in Alabama. Murphy Oil
defended itself against the employees' claims
by seeking to enforce the Arbitration
Agreement. Murphy Oil was not retaliating
as Bill Johnson's may have been. Moreover,
the Board's holding is based solely on
Murphy Oil's enforcement of an agreement
that the Board deemed unlawful because it
required employees to individually arbitrate
employment-related disputes. Our decision in
D.R. Horton forecloses that argument in this
circuit. Though the Board might not need to
acquiesce in our decisions, it is a bit bold for

The Board rooted its analysis in part in Bill
Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461
U.S. 731, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 76 L.Ed.2d 277
(1983). That decision discussed the balance
between an employer's First Amendment
right to litigate and an employee's Section 7
right to engage in concerted activity. In that
case, a waitress filed a charge with the Board
after a restaurant terminated her employment;
she believed she was fired because she
attempted to organize a union. After the
Board's General Counsel issued a complaint,
the waitress and several others picketed the
restaurant, handing out leaflets and asking
customers to boycott eating there. Id. In
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it to hold that an employer who followed the
reasoning of our D.R. Horton decision had no
basis in fact or law or an “illegal objective”
in doing so. The Board might want to strike a
more respectful balance between its views
and those of circuit courts reviewing its
orders.

Murphy Oil had at least a colorable argument
that the Arbitration Agreement was valid
when its defensive motion was made, as its
response to the lawsuit was not “lack[ing] a
reasonable basis in fact or law,” and was not
filed with an illegal objective under federal
law. Murphy Oil's motion to dismiss and
compel arbitration did not constitute an
unfair labor practice because it was not
“baseless.” We decline to enforce the Board's
order awarding attorneys' fees and expenses.

Moreover, the timing of Murphy Oil's motion
to dismiss when compared to the timing of
the D.R. Horton decisions counsels against
finding a violation of Section 8(a)(1). The
relevant timeline of events is as follows:

***

(1) July 2010: Murphy Oil filed its motion to
dismiss and sought to compel arbitration in
the Alabama litigation;

The Board's order that Section 8(a)(1) has
been violated because an employee would
reasonably
interpret
the
Arbitration
Agreement in effect for employees hired
before March 2012 as prohibiting the filing
of an unfair labor practice charge is
ENFORCED. Murphy Oil's petition for
review of the Board's decision is otherwise
GRANTED.

(2) January 2012: the Board in D.R. Horton
held it to be unlawful to require employees to
arbitrate
employment-related
claims
individually, and the D.R. Horton agreement
violated the NLRA because it could be
reasonably construed as prohibiting the filing
of Board charges;
(3) October 2012: the Board's General
Counsel amended the complaint against
Murphy Oil to allege that Murphy Oil's
motion in the Alabama litigation violated
Section 8(a)(1); and
(4) December 2013: this court granted D.R.
Horton's petition for review of the Board's
order and held that agreements requiring
individual arbitration of employment-related
claims are lawful but that the specific
agreement was unlawful because it could be
reasonably interpreted as prohibiting the
filing of Board charges.
In summary, Murphy Oil's motion was filed
a year and a half before the Board had even
spoken on the lawfulness of such agreements
in light of the NLRA. This court later held
that such agreements were generally lawful.
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“SCOTUS To Decide Arbitration Issue; Unclear If Trump Pick Will Be
On Bench In Time”
Forbes
Jessica Karmasek
January 19, 2017

The U.S. Supreme Court last week agreed to
review the validity of class action waiver
clauses in employer/employee arbitration
agreements, and one attorney says its
decision could have “important implications”
for businesses.

waiver provisions in an arbitration clause in
an employment contract.
“In other words, the question is whether
employers can utilize arbitration agreements
within employment contracts that require
their employees to resolve disputes
individually, as opposed to collectively,”
McCabe explained.

In an order list Friday, the nation’s high court
granted petitions for writ of certiorari, or
review, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,
Ernst & Young v. Morris and NLRB v.
Murphy Oil USA Inc.

The court’s decision in the cases aims to
resolve a significant split among federal
appellate courts.

Julianna Thomas McCabe is a class action
litigator and appellate lawyer with national
experience representing clients in the
financial services industry. She also chairs
Carlton Fields’ National Class Actions
practice group.

The Second, Fifth and Eighth circuit courts
have held that the FAA requires the
enforcement of class action waivers in
employment arbitration agreements.
The Seventh and the Ninth circuits have
reached the opposite conclusion, holding that
such waivers are unenforceable.

McCabe, who has represented clients at
arbitration and has litigated the enforceability
of contractual arbitration clauses under the
Federal Arbitration Act, told Legal Newsline
it “made sense” for the Supreme Court to
consolidate the three cases, noting that all
three petitions raise an identical issue.

In May, the Seventh Circuit ruled against
Epic Systems, a Wisconsin-based health-care
software company.
Epic required certain groups of employees to
agree to bring any wage-and-hour claims
against the company only through individual
arbitration. The agreement did not permit
collective arbitration or collective action in
any other forum.

The court now must consider whether the
National Labor Relations Act bars
enforcement under the FAA, of class action
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The Seventh Circuit said in its decision that
employers can’t prevent class, or collective,
actions through waivers in mandatory
arbitration agreements.

The current high court is without Justice
Antonin Scalia, who died in February. He
served on the high court for nearly 30 years.
His death has left eight justices on the court,
split 4-4 between being fairly conservative
and fairly liberal.

In August, the majority of a three-judge panel
of the Ninth Circuit vacated a district court’s
order compelling individual arbitration in a
class action filed against Ernst & Young by
its employees.

Scalia authored the Supreme Court’s 5-4
opinion in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. In
April 2011, the court ruled that companies
can enforce contracts that bar class action
lawsuits. Meaning businesses that include
arbitration agreements with class action
waivers can require consumers to bring
claims only in individual arbitrations, rather
than in court as part of a class action.

The Ninth Circuit sided with the approach of
the National Labor Relations Board in ruling
that individual arbitration waiver agreements
are unenforceable under federal law.
The employees, Stephen Morris and Kelly
McDaniel, alleged Ernst & Young, one of the
“Big Four” audit firms, misclassified
employees to deny overtime wages in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
California labor laws.

Experts called the decision a “game-changer”
for class action litigation.
McCabe said the court’s current makeup
could have an impact on the three cases at
issue.

In Murphy Oil, the NLRB had ruled that
similar arbitration agreements barring the gas
station chain’s workers from pursuing class
or collective actions were unlawful.
However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
board’s ruling.

“If the justices deadlock 4-4, each case will
be affirmed as decided by the circuit court
without an opinion and with no precedential
value,” she explained.

The NLRB, an independent agency of the
U.S. government, is charged with
investigating and remedying unfair labor
practices.

“That seems unlikely to happen, however,
because the court accepted certiorari to
resolve a split among the circuit courts as to
whether such arbitration clauses are
enforceable.”

McCabe said it’s too early to predict how the
court will decide.

A ninth justice may or may not be confirmed
in time to participate, she noted.

“In recent years, the court has issued a series
of pro-arbitration opinions, but it has not
addressed this precise question,” she noted.
“The court also is missing one of the
conservative members who voted in the
majority in each of those prior cases.”

“It is unclear whether Democrats in the
Senate will attempt to stall or block a new
appointee of President-elect Trump,”
McCabe said.
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Either way, the cases have “important
implications” for businesses, she said.
“The individual resolution of employment
disputes in an arbitral forum is much more
cost-effective and private, than the litigation
of employment disputes in a class action or
collective format in a judicial forum,”
McCabe explained.
In recent years, following Concepcion and
similar decisions, the use of class action
waivers in arbitration agreements in various
types of contracts has significantly increased.
According to Carlton Fields’ 2016 Class
Action Survey, the use of arbitration clauses
barring class actions went from a reported
16.1 percent to 39.2 percent from 2012 to
2015.
McCabe said she expects the three cases to be
set for oral argument at the end of the current
session. The Supreme Court holds oral
argument between October and April, and the
cases have been allotted a total of one hour
for argument.
If the court hears argument by April, a
decision could come by late June or early
July, when the court recesses for the summer,
she said.
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“Murphy Oil’s law: Solicitor General’s office reverses course in
arbitration cases, supports employers”
SCOTUSblog
Amy Howe
June 19, 2017

It is rare for the Office of the Solicitor
General to change its position in a case before
the Supreme Court after a change in
administrations, even when the party in
control of the White House changes. But that
is exactly what happened last week, when the
Trump administration weighed in on an
important arbitration case: The office urged
the justices to affirm the same decision that,
on behalf of the National Labor Relations
Board, it had previously asked them to
review and overturn.

along with two others filed by employers
(Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris and Epic
Systems v. Lewis), and consolidated the three
cases for one hour of oral argument.
Under the briefing schedule ordered in the
case, the employers in all three cases filed
their briefs on June 9, with briefs from the
employees and the NLRB to follow on
August 9. But on Friday (the deadline under
the court’s rules to do so), the United States
filed a “friend of the court” brief supporting
the employers. The petition for review had
been signed by seven lawyers from the
NLRB, including its general counsel. Those
NLRB lawyers were conspicuously absent
from Friday’s brief, which was signed only
by lawyers from the Solicitor General’s
office. Acting Solicitor General Jeffrey Wall
acknowledged that his office had previously
filed a petition on behalf of the NLRB,
“defending the Board’s view that agreements
of the sort at issue here are unenforceable.”
But, Wall continued, “since the change in
administration, the Office reconsidered the
issue and has reached the opposite
conclusion.” In particular, Wall explained,
the NLRB had not given “adequate weight to
the
congressional
policy
favoring
enforcement of arbitration agreements that is
reflected in the” Federal Arbitration Act.

The about-face came in National Labor
Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, in
which the justices have agreed to decide
whether agreements to forgo class actions or
collective proceedings and instead resolve
employer-employee
disputes
through
individual arbitration are enforceable under
the Federal Arbitration Act. In its petition for
review on behalf of the NLRB, filed in
September 2016, the Solicitor General’s
office had argued that such agreements are
not, because the National Labor Relations
Act protects employees’ ability to engage in
joint actions regarding the terms or
conditions of their employment. On January
13, 2017, just seven days before the
inauguration of President Donald Trump, the
Supreme Court granted the NLRB’s petition,
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In a press release published on the NLRB’s
website, the NLRB indicated that Wall had
authorized it to represent itself in the
Supreme Court proceedings in this case, and
nothing in the brief of the United States
suggests that the NLRB has changed its
position. This means that the NLRB is likely
to file its own brief, reiterating its original
position in the case, in early August. And if
the United States seeks and receives
permission to argue in the case, as it virtually
always does in cases in which it files “friend
of the court” briefs, a lawyer for the United
States would argue against a lawyer for a U.S.
agency – a phenomenon perhaps even more
uncommon than a change in position
following a change in administration.
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“5th Circ. Reverses NLRB In Murphy Oil Class Waiver Fight”
Law360
Y. Peter Kang
October 26, 2015

The Fifth Circuit on Monday mostly reversed
a National Labor Relations Board ruling that
found Murphy Oil arbitration agreements
barring workers from pursuing class actions
unlawful, saying it is bound by a December
2013 decision that rejected the labor board’s
ruling in a similar case involving D.R.
Horton.

case, saying the labor board may not know
which circuit court’s law will be applied in
various appeals of the NLRB’s rulings.
“We do not celebrate the Board’s failure to
follow our D.R. Horton reasoning, but neither
do we condemn its nonacquiescence,” it said.
The appellate court enforced the NLRB’s
order with respect to Murphy Oil workers
who were subject to terms of an arbitration
agreement before the company made the
revisions, saying Murphy Oil will need to
change the agreements for any employee still
subject to the old contract.

A three-judge Fifth Circuit panel shot down
the NLRB’s arguments that Murphy Oil USA
Inc.’s arbitration agreement, revised in
March 2012 after the board’s decision in the
D.R. Horton case, violated the National
Labor Relations Act.

Monday’s ruling follows a June decision by
the Fifth Circuit denying the NLRB’s bid for
en banc review of Murphy Oil’s appeal,
which effectively killed the agency’s attempt
to revisit the appellate court’s 2013 rejection
of the board’s D.R. Horton decision holding
that mandatory arbitration agreements
prohibiting workers from pursuing class or
collective claims violate federal labor law.

“Murphy Oil committed no unfair labor
practice by requiring employees to relinquish
their right to pursue class or collective claims
in all forums by signing the arbitration
agreements at issue here,” the Fifth Circuit
wrote in a 13-page published opinion.
“Reading the Murphy Oil contract as a
whole, it would be unreasonable for an
employee to construe the revised arbitration
agreement as prohibiting the filing of Board
charges when the agreement says the
opposite.”

While the NLRB argued that the Fifth Circuit
should review whether it misapprehended
U.S. Supreme Court precedent in its 2-1
decision that struck down the holding, the
appellate court opted on June 24 not to do so,
according to court documents.

But the Fifth Circuit stopped short of granting
Murphy Oil’s request for the NLRB to be
held in contempt for not following the
appeals court’s ruling in the D.R. Horton
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In the Murphy Oil case, the NLRB doubled
down on its controversial conclusion in D.R.
Horton, reiterating in an October 2014
decision that making workers agree to
individual arbitration of all workplace
disputes as a condition of employment
violates the NLRA.
During oral argument in August, U.S. Circuit
Judge Edith H. Jones told NLRB counsel not
to argue the D.R. Horton case.
“We're bound by it,” Jones said, "and I don't
think you can expect us to be writing against
the binding precedent of this court."
An attorney for Murphy Oil told Law360 on
Monday that it was the decision they
expected, but did not elaborate further.
An NLRB attorney declined to comment. An
attorney for intervenor Sheila Hobson did not
immediately respond to a request for
comment late Monday.
U.S. Circuit Judges Leslie H. Southwick,
Edith H. Jones and Jerry E. Smith sat on the
panel for the Fifth Circuit.
Murphy Oil is represented by Jeffrey A.
Schwartz and Daniel D. Schudroff of Jackson
Lewis PC.
Worker and charging party Sheila Hobson is
represented by Glen M. Connor and Richard
P. Rouco of Quinn Connor Weaver Davies &
Rouco LLP.
The NLRB is represented by Kira Dellinger
Vol, Jeffrey W. Burritt and Linda Dreeben.
The case is Murphy Oil USA Inc. v. NLRB,
case number 14-60800, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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Patchak v. Zinke
16-498
Ruling Below: Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995 (C.A.D.C., 2016)
Resident of rural community brought action challenging Secretary of the Interior's decision to
take a parcel of land into trust on behalf of the Gun Lake Indian Tribe for casino use pursuant to
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). Tribe intervened as defendant. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, Richard J. Leon, J., 646 F.Supp.2d 72, dismissed action.
Resident appealed. The Court of Appeals, Randolph, Senior Circuit Judge, 632 F.3d 702,
reversed and remanded. On remand, resident and tribe cross-moved for summary judgment. The
District Court granted intervenor defendant's motion and denied resident's motion based on
Congress's enactment of the Gun Lake Act, which reaffirmed the Department of the Interior's
decision to take the land into trust for the tribe and removed jurisdiction from the federal courts
over any actions relating to such property. Appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, Wilkins, Circuit Judge, affirmed, holding that the Gun Lake Act did not encroach upon
Article III judicial power of the courts to decide cases and controversies in violation of
separation of powers doctrine, the Act did not violate resident's First Amendment right to
petition, the Act did not violate resident's right to due process, even if he had a protected
property right in his cause of action, and the Act was not an unconstitutional bill of attainder.
Question Presented: Whether a statute directing the federal courts to “promptly dismiss” a
pending lawsuit following substantive determinations by the courts (including this court's
determination that the “suit may proceed”) – without amending the underlying substantive or
procedural laws – violates the Constitution's separation of powers principles.

David Patchak, Appellant
v.
Sally Jewell, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the
Interior, et al., Appellees
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
Decided on July 15, 2016
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
Wilkins, Circuit Judge:

Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 465.
The land, called the Bradley Property, had
been put into trust for the use of the Match–
E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians in Michigan, otherwise known as the
Gun Lake Band or the Gun Lake Tribe.

David Patchak brought this suit under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§
702, 705, challenging the authority of the
Department of the Interior to take title to a
particular tract of land under the Indian
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Following
the
Supreme
Court's
determination in 2012 that Mr. Patchak had
prudential standing to bring this lawsuit,
Congress passed the Gun Lake Trust Land
Reaffirmation Act (the Gun Lake Act), a
stand-alone
statute
reaffirming
the
Department of the Interior's decision to take
the land in question into trust for the Gun
Lake Tribe, and removing jurisdiction from
the federal courts over any actions relating to
that property. Taking into account this new
legal landscape, the District Court
determined on summary judgment that it was
stripped of its jurisdiction to consider Mr.
Patchak's claim. Holding additionally that the
Act was not constitutionally infirm, as Mr.
Patchak contended, the District Court
dismissed the case.

acknowledgement under the modern
regulatory regime of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, in 1992. The Tribe was formally
recognized by the Department of the Interior
in 1999. In 2001, the Tribe petitioned for a
tract of land in Wayland Township,
Michigan—called the Bradley Property—to
be put into trust under the IRA. The Tribe
sought to use the land to construct and
operate a gaming and entertainment facility.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs approved the
petition in 2005, placing the Bradley Property
into trust for the Tribe's use. The Gun Lake
Casino opened on February 10, 2011.
David Patchak lives in a rural area of
Wayland Township commonly referred to as
Shelbyville, in close proximity to the Bradley
Property. Mr. Patchak asserts that he moved
to the area because of its unique rural setting,
and that he values the quiet life afforded him
there. Mr. Patchak filed the present lawsuit
against the Secretary of the Interior and the
Assistant Secretary of the Interior for the
Bureau of Indian Affairs on August 1, 2008,
invoking the court's jurisdiction under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Mr.
Patchak claimed that he would be injured by
the construction and operation of a casino in
his community because it would, among
other things, irreversibly change the rural
character of the area, increase traffic and
pollution, and divert local resources away
from existing residents. Mr. Patchak argued
that because the Tribe was not formally
recognized when the IRA was enacted in
June 1934, the Secretary lacked the authority
to put the Bradley Property into trust for the
Gun Lake Tribe. The Gun Lake Tribe
intervened as a defendant.

Mr. Patchak now appeals the dismissal of his
suit, as well as a collateral decision regarding
the District Court's denial of a motion to
strike a supplement to the administrative
record. For the reasons stated below, we
affirm the District Court's determination that
the Gun Lake Act is constitutionally sound
and, accordingly, that Mr. Patchak's suit must
be dismissed. We further conclude that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Mr. Patchak's motion to strike a
supplement to the administrative record.
I.
The Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians (the Gun Lake Tribe) is
an Indian tribe whose members descend from
a band of Pottawatomi Indians, led by Chief
Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish,
who
occupied present day western Michigan. See
Proposed Findings for Acknowledgement of
the Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians of Michigan. While the
Tribe had been a party to many treaties with
the United States government in the 18th and
19th centuries, it only began pursuing federal

In response to Mr. Patchak's complaint, the
United States and the Tribe claimed that Mr.
Patchak lacked prudential standing because
his interest in the Bradley Property was
“fundamentally at odds with the purpose of
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the IRA” and he therefore did not fall within
the IRA's “zone of interests.” The District
Court agreed, and dismissed the complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Patchak appealed to this Court, and we
reversed. The Supreme Court agreed, holding
that Patchak did indeed have prudential
standing to bring his suit. The case was
remanded to the District Court for further
proceedings.

filed or maintained in a Federal court and
shall be promptly dismissed.

In the time between the Supreme Court's
prudential standing determination and the
parties' renewed attention to the case, both
the Department of the Interior and Congress
weighed in further on the legal status of the
Gun Lake Tribe and the Bradley Property,
respectively. First, the Department of the
Interior issued an Amended Notice of
Decision approving an application the Tribe
had submitted for two other parcels of land it
sought to acquire. As part of this Notice of
Decision, the Secretary expressly considered,
and confirmed, its authority to take land into
trust for the benefit of the Gun Lake Tribe.
Second, on September 26, 2014, President
Obama signed the Gun Lake Act into law.
The substantive text of the Gun Lake Act is
as follows:

Shortly following the enactment of the Gun
Lake Act, the parties filed motions for
summary judgment. The District Court
determined that, as a result of this legislation,
it was now stripped of jurisdiction to consider
Mr. Patchak's claim. Rejecting Mr. Patchak's
constitutional challenges to the Gun Lake
Act, the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Government and the
Tribe, and dismissed the case. The District
Court also denied Mr. Patchak's Motion to
Strike
the
Administrative
Record
Supplement, which had challenged the
addition of the Amended Notice of Decision
to the record before the court.

(c) RETENTION OF FUTURE RIGHTS.—
Nothing in this Act alters or diminishes the
right of the Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish
Band of Pottawatomi Indians from seeking to
have any additional land taken into trust by
the United States for the benefit of the Band.
Gun Lake Act § 2.

Mr. Patchak now appeals those decisions.
II.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The land taken into trust
by the United States for the benefit of the
Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians and described in the
final Notice of Determination of the
Department of the Interior is reaffirmed as
trust land, and the actions of the Secretary of
the Interior in taking that land into trust are
ratified and confirmed.

The language of the Gun Lake Act makes
plain that Congress has stripped federal
courts of subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the merits of Mr. Patchak's
complaint, which undisputedly “relat[es] to
the land described” in Section 2(a) of the Act.
Accordingly, Patchak's suit “shall not be ...
maintained ... and shall be promptly
dismissed.” Of course, this is only so if the
Gun Lake Act is not otherwise
constitutionally infirm, as “a statute's use of
the language of jurisdiction cannot operate as
a talisman that ipso facto sweeps aside every
possible constitutional objection.” The
federal courts have “presumptive jurisdiction

(b) NO CLAIMS.—Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, an action (including
an action pending in a Federal court as of the
date of enactment of this Act) relating to the
land described in subsection (a) shall not be
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... to inquire into the constitutionality of a
jurisdiction-stripping statute.”

These principles do not require, as Mr.
Patchak suggests, that in order to affect
pending litigation, Congress must directly
amend the substantive laws upon which the
suit is based. Indeed, Supreme Court
precedent belies such a contention.

Mr. Patchak's constitutional challenges to the
Gun Lake Act are pure questions of law that
we review de novo.

In Seattle Audubon, for example, the
Supreme Court considered the impact of new
legislation on pending cases challenging the
federal government's efforts to allow the
harvesting and sale of old-growth timber in
the Pacific Northwest. The legislation was
the Northwest Timber Compromise, a
provision of the Department of the Interior
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1990. It established rules to govern the forest
harvesting at issue in the pending
consolidated cases, and spoke expressly to
those suits—even identifying them by
caption number. If loggers complied with the
new rules, Congress posited, they would
thereby satisfy the statutory obligations on
which the pending environmental litigation
rested. The Ninth Circuit held that the
Northwest
Timber
Compromise
unconstitutionally dictated the outcome of
pending litigation without amending the
underlying laws, but the Supreme Court
disagreed. The Court held that the legislation
effectively “replaced the legal standards
underlying the two original challenges ...
without directing particular applications
under either the old or the new standards.”
Because the provision “compelled changes in
law,” the Court concluded that the provision
“affected the adjudication of the [specifically
identified] cases ... by effectively modifying
the provisions at issue in those cases.”

A.
Mr. Patchak first argues that the Gun Lake
Act encroaches upon the Article III judicial
power of the courts to decide cases and
controversies, in violation of well-established
constitutional principles of the separation of
powers. Article III imbues in the Judiciary
“the ‘province and duty ... to say what the law
is' in particular cases and controversies.” This
endowment of authority necessarily “blocks
Congress from ‘requir[ing] federal courts to
exercise the judicial power in a manner that
Article III forbids.’ ”
Congress is generally free to direct district
courts to apply newly enacted legislation in
pending civil cases. Without question, “a
statute does not impinge on judicial power
when it directs courts to apply a new legal
standard to undisputed facts.” This rule is no
different when the newly enacted legislation
in question removes the judiciary's authority
to review a particular case or class of cases.
It is well settled that “Congress has the power
(within limits) to tell the courts what classes
of cases they may decide.” Congress may not,
however, “prescribe or superintend how
[courts] decide those cases.” Congress
impermissibly encroaches upon the judiciary
when it “prescribe[s] rules of decision” for a
pending case. In short, Congress may not
direct the result of pending litigation unless it
does so by “supply[ing] new law.” Mr.
Patchak argues that the Gun Lake Act did not
provide any new legal standard to apply, but
rather impermissibly directed the result of his
lawsuit under pre-existing law.

The Supreme Court's recent Bank Markazi
decision likewise applied new legislation to
pending litigation. That legislation did not
directly amend or modify the particular
statute upon which the pending litigation was
based. Section 502 of the Iran Threat
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“present[ed] no more difficulty than the
statute upheld in [Seattle Audubon], as Public
Law No. 107–11 similarly amend[ed] the
applicable substantive law.”

Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012 had been passed in order “[t]o place
beyond dispute” the availability of certain
assets for satisfaction of judgments rendered
in certain specifically identified terrorism
cases. The statute was enacted as a
freestanding measure, not as an amendment
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA) (which allows American
nationals to file suit against state sponsors of
terrorism in United States courts, see 28
U.S.C. § 1605A), or the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) (which
authorizes execution of judgments obtained
under the FSIA's terrorism exception against
“the blocked assets of [a] terrorist party”). Id.
Rejecting a challenge similar to the one Mr.
Patchak pursues here—that the provision
“did not simply amend pre-existing law,” id.
at 1325—the Court held that “§ 8772
changed the law by establishing new
substantive standards.” As the Court
explained, “§ 8772 provides a new standard
clarifying that, if Iran owns certain assets, the
victims of Iran-sponsored terrorist attacks
will be permitted to execute against those
assets.”

Consistent with those decisions, we conclude
that the Gun Lake Act has amended the
substantive law applicable to Mr. Patchak's
claims. That it did so without directly
amending or modifying the APA or the IRA
is no matter. Through its ratification and
confirmation of the Department of the
Interior's decision to take the Bradley
Property into trust, expressed in Section 2(a),
and its clear withdrawal of subject matter
jurisdiction in Section 2(b), the Gun Lake Act
has “changed the law.” More to the point,
Section 2(b) provides a new legal standard
we are obliged to apply: if an action relates to
the Bradley Property, it must promptly be
dismissed.
Mr. Patchak's suit is just such an action.
That this change has only affected Mr.
Patchak's lawsuit does not change our
analysis here, for Congress is not limited to
enacting generally applicable legislation.
Particularized legislative action is not
unconstitutional on that basis alone. “Even
laws that impose a duty or liability upon a
single individual or firm are not on that
account invalid....”

Our decision in National Coalition to Save
Our Mall is also instructive. There, we
considered a separation-of-powers challenge
to a statute that withdrew from the federal
courts subject matter jurisdiction to review
challenges to specific executive decisions
relating to the placement of the World War II
Memorial on the National Mall. In rejecting
that challenge, we emphasized that there is no
“prohibition against Congress's changing the
rule of decision in a pending case, or (more
narrowly) changing the rule to assure a progovernment outcome.” And while this Court
“express[ed] no view” on the question
whether a court could do so without
amending the substantive law on which a
pending claim rested, we did note that the
provision at issue (Public Law No. 107–11)

In passing the Gun Lake Act, Congress
exercised its “broad general powers to
legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers
that [the Supreme Court] ha[s] consistently
described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’ ”
Accordingly, we ought to defer to the policy
judgment reflected therein. Such is our role.
Indeed, “[a]pplying laws implementing
Congress' policy judgments, with fidelity to
those judgments, is commonplace for the
Judiciary.”
B.
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By stripping federal courts of subject matter
jurisdiction over challenges to the status of
the Bradley Property, Congress has made its
determination as to what is “proper for the
public good.” There is no constitutional
infirmity here.

Mr. Patchak next asserts that the Gun Lake
Act burdens his First Amendment right to
petition. See U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress
shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of
the people ... to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.”). The Petition
Clause “protects the right of individuals to
appeal to courts and other forums established
by the government for resolution of legal
disputes.”

C.
Mr. Patchak also claims that the Gun Lake
Act implicates his rights under the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Fifth
Amendment instructs that the federal
government may not deprive individuals of
property “without due process of law.” In
order to determine whether there has been a
violation of due process rights, we undertake
a two-part inquiry: first, we must determine
whether the claimant was deprived of a
protected interest; and second, if the claimant
was so deprived, we then consider what
process the claimant was due.

The right of access to courts is, without
question, “an aspect of the First Amendment
right to petition the government.” For
example, an individual does not have a First
Amendment right of access to courts in order
to pursue frivolous litigation. More to the
point, the right to access federal courts is
subject to Congress's Article III power to
define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts of the United States. Congress may
withhold jurisdiction from inferior federal
courts “in the exact degrees and character
which to Congress may seem proper for the
public good.”

Mr. Patchak identifies a potentially protected
property interest in his unadjudicated claim.
The Supreme Court has “affirmatively
settled” that a cause of action is a species of
property requiring due process protection.
Surely so, as “[t]he hallmark of property ... is
an individual entitlement grounded in state
law, which cannot be removed except ‘for
cause.’ ” Once the legislature confers an
interest by statute, it may not constitutionally
authorize the deprivation of that interest
without
implementing
appropriate
procedural safeguards.

Moreover, the Gun Lake Act does not
foreclose Mr. Patchak's right to petition the
government in all forums; it affects only his
ability to do so via federal courts. And while
he argues that other forms of petition—such
as seeking redress directly from the agency—
would be futile, Patchak concedes that he is
not entitled to a successful outcome in his
petition, or even for the government to listen
or respond to his complaints. Rightfully so.
“Nothing in the First Amendment or in [the
Supreme] Court's case law interpreting it
suggests that the rights to speak, associate,
and
petition
require
government
policymakers to listen or respond to
individuals' communications on public
issues.”

But even assuming that there may be a
property right to pursue a cause of action, in
a challenge to legislation affecting that very
suit, the legislative process provides all the
process that is due. As discussed above, the
legislature has the power to change the
underlying laws applicable to a case while it
is pending and, as a result, to alter the
outcome of that case.
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In Logan, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that “[o]f course,” a legislature “remains free
to create substantive defenses or immunities
for use in adjudication—or to eliminate its
statutorily-created
causes
of
action
altogether—just as it can amend or
terminate” benefits programs it has put into
place. Indeed, “[n]o person has a vested
interest in any rule of law, entitling him to
insist that it shall remain unchanged for his
benefit.” Accordingly, while a cause of
action may be a “species of property” that is
afforded due process protection, there is no
deprivation of property without due process
when legislation changes a previously
existing and still-pending cause of action. In
such a circumstance, “the legislative
determination provides all the process that is
due.”

In order to decide whether a statute
impermissibly inflicts punishment, we
consider each case in “its own highly
particularized context.” In so doing, we
pursue a three-part inquiry:
(1) whether the challenged statute falls within
the historical meaning of legislative
punishment;
(2) whether the statute, ‘viewed in terms of
the type and severity of burdens imposed,
reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive
legislative purposes'; and
(3) whether the legislative record ‘evinces a
congressional intent to punish.’
These factors are considered independently,
and are weighed together to resolve a bill of
attainder claim. None of the three factors is
necessarily dispositive, but this Court has
noted that the second factor—what is called
the “functional test”—“invariably appears to
be the most important of the three.”

We have no reason to except the Gun Lake
Act from this general approach. Congress
made a considered determination to ratify the
Department of the Interior's decision to take
the Bradley Property into trust for the Gun
Lake Tribe, and further to remove any
potential impediments to the finality of that
decision. It did not violate Mr. Patchak's due
process rights by doing so.

Historically, laws invalidated as bills of
attainder “offer[ed] a ready checklist of
deprivations
and
disabilities
so
disproportionately
severe
and
so
inappropriate to nonpunitive ends that they
unquestionably have been held to fall within
the proscription of [Article] I, § 9.” “This
checklist includes sentences of death, bills of
pains and penalties, and legislative bars to
participation in specified employments or
professions.” Jurisdictional limitations are
generally not of this type.

D.
Mr. Patchak's final constitutional challenge
to the Gun Lake Act is that it constitutes an
impermissible Bill of Attainder. Under this
provision, Congress may not “enact[ ] ‘a law
that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable individual
without provision of the protections of a
judicial trial.’ ” A law is prohibited under the
Bill of Attainder Clause if two elements are
met: (1) the statute applies with specificity;
and (2) the statute imposes punishment. We
are able to resolve Mr. Patchak's challenge on
the second element alone, because the Gun
Lake Act is not punitive.

The second prong of the inquiry, the
“functional test,” requires that the legislation
have “a legitimate nonpunitive purpose” and
that there is “a rational connection between
the burden imposed and [the] nonpunitive
purposes.” In other words, the means
employed by the statute must be rationally
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designed to meet its legitimate nonpunitive
goals.

The Government suggests that there is an
alternative ground on which we could rule,
arguing that the Gun Lake Act provides an
exemption to the APA's waiver of sovereign
immunity. While the Government did not
make this argument in the proceedings
below, sovereign immunity is a threshold
jurisdictional question that speaks to the
court's authority to hear a given case, and so
we would be well within bounds to consider
the question. “Indeed, the ‘terms of the
United States' consent to be sued in any court
define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the
suit.” Nevertheless, because we conclude that
the Gun Lake Act is not constitutionally
infirm, and that subject matter jurisdiction
over Mr. Patchak's claim has thus validly
been withdrawn, we need not consider the
matter further.

The Gun Lake Act passes this test. The Gun
Lake Act serves the legitimate nonpunitive
purpose of “provid[ing] certainty to the legal
status of the [Bradley Property], on which the
Tribe has begun gaming operations as a
means of economic development for its
community.” Congress accomplished this
goal by affirming and ratifying the
Department of the Interior's initial decision to
put the land into trust for the Tribe in Section
2(a), but also by removing jurisdiction over
matters relating to the land in Section 2(b). In
point of fact, Congress's intended goal of
providing certainty with respect to the trust
land would have been impossible to achieve
absent the termination of any outstanding
litigation—specifically, Mr. Patchak's suit.
The legislative history reflects an
acknowledgement of this fact, noting that Mr.
Patchak's suit “places in jeopardy the Tribe's
only tract of land held in trust and the
economic development project that the Tribe
is currently operating on the land.” Whatever
burden is imposed by Section 2(b), on Mr.
Patchak or otherwise, the statute is rationally
designed to meet its legitimate, nonpunitive
purpose of providing certainty with respect to
the trust land.

III.
In a separate challenge to the proceedings
below, Mr. Patchak contends that the District
Court erred by permitting the administrative
record to be supplemented. We review the
District Court's denial of Mr. Patchak's
Motion to Strike the Administrative Record
Supplement for abuse of discretion.
Although this case may not present
circumstances typically permitting the
agency to supplement the record, see id. the
District Court's failure to strike the
supplemental information provided to it was
not an abuse of discretion.

Finally, the legislative record does not evince
a congressional intent to punish. Mr. Patchak
has presented no evidence, other than the
acknowledgement that his case would be
affected, for his claim that Congress
purposefully targeted him for retaliation
through the Gun Lake Act. While it may be
true that Mr. Patchak was adversely affected
as a result of the legislation, the record does
not show that Congress acted with any
punitive or retaliatory intent.

The District Court denied Mr. Patchak's
Motion to Strike Supplemental Record “[f]or
the reasons set forth in the Memorandum
Opinion” entered on the same date, the
District Court's determination, at issue in this
appeal, that it was without jurisdiction to
consider the suit and that the case was to be
dismissed in its entirety. The District Court
only mentioned the record supplement in the

E.
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Procedural Background section of its opinion
in order to indicate the “events [that] have
altered the legal landscape” in the time since
the case was remanded from the Supreme
Court. The District Court did not abuse its
discretion by referencing that development in
this way. Nor did it abuse its discretion by
denying a motion to strike a supplement to
the record at the same time that it was
dismissing the case in its entirety for lack of
jurisdiction.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's
decisions below are affirmed.
So ordered.
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“Justices May Rein In Congress' Ability To Upend Lawsuits”
Law360
Andrew Westney
May 1, 2017

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
consider whether a federal law meant to end
a suit challenging a Michigan tribal casino
project is an abuse of congressional authority,
a move that comes as the Trump
administration's attacks on the judiciary have
raised more general separation of powers
concerns.

the center of debate over the president's travel
ban, with Attorney General Jeff Sessions'
recent disparaging comment on a Hawaii
federal judge's block of the ban following
earlier remarks by the president critical of the
federal judiciary.
The Patchak case will now turn public
attention to another axis of the federal
balance of power, as the justices examine
"how much deference can be granted to the
legislative branch and how far they can go in
approaching judicial function," Meyer said.

The high court granted certiorari Monday to
a petition by David Patchak, who claims the
D.C. Circuit's upholding of the Gun Lake Act
— which led to the dismissal of his suit over
the U.S. Department of the Interior's taking
of a parcel of land into trust for the Match-EBe-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians' casino — could give Congress the
power to stop any lawsuit it wants to.

The current petition actually marks the
second time Patchak's case has reached the
high court, after the justices ruled in 2012 that
Patchak had standing and the suit could go
forward.

The court's decision to address the separation
of powers issue could put teeth in a longstanding high court precedent meant to
prevent Congress from making inroads on
judicial authority, attorneys say.

Following remand of the case to the district
court, Congress passed the Gun Lake Act,
which was signed into law by President
Barack Obama in 2014. Among its
provisions, the statute affirmed the DOI's
decision to take the tribal land into trust under
the Indian Reorganization Act and stripped
Patchak and any other potential claimants of
the ability to challenge that decision in
federal court.

And the justices will weigh the limits of
congressional power "at an interesting time,
when the question of judicial deference to
other branches is very much on people's
minds," Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton
LLP partner Jonathan Meyer said.

At the center of Patchak's petition is whether
the Supreme Court's 1871 decision in U.S. v.
Klein, which ruled a law unconstitutional

The battle between Trump's executive
authority and the courts' power has been at
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because it directed a decision in a pending
case without amending any law, means the
Gun Lake Act is invalid.

the case submitted by several federal courts
scholars.
"We're in an age of rather unprecedented
attacks on the federal courts, including by the
sitting president, and so it seems like an
especially dangerous time for the courts to be
giving more power to the political branches,"
Vladeck said.

That issue was tackled by the high court just
last year in its Bank Markazi v. Peterson
decision, in which the court upheld a 2012
federal law that retroactively made assets
linked to Bank Markazi, the Iranian central
bank, subject to a judgment in favor of
families of the victims of the 1983 Marine
Corps barracks bombing in Beirut.

And a dissent in the Bank Markazi case by
Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justice
Sonia Sotomayor, hinted at dissatisfaction
among at least some of the justices that the
decision could be interpreted overly broadly
to allow Congress to direct courts to make
specific decisions, attorneys say.

But while the DOI relied on the Bank
Markazi ruling in its opposition to Patchak's
petition, the justices' decision to take his case
may indicate that they're ready to draw a line
against Congress treading on the courts' turf,
attorneys say.

Congress' passage of the Gun Lake Act to
snuff out Patchak's suit after the high court's
first ruling in the case may have increased the
justices' willingness to hear the suit again,
and may not bode well for the government
and the Gun Lake Tribe, attorneys say.

According to the petition, the law at issue in
the Bank Markazi case didn't create a
separation of powers violation because it
created new substantive legal standards that
it allowed a lower court to apply, rather than
simply requiring the dismissal of litigation.

But if the government does win the case, that
could set a template for Congress to pass
more legislation targeting suits, Mayer
Brown LLP special counsel Charles A.
Rothfeld said.

"If Congress allows the Gun Lake Act to
stand, it's hard to imagine what principled
limitation there is on Congress' power to
undertake similar legislation, which
effectively dictates the outcome of the case
after it's already been considered," Scott E.
Gant of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, who
represents Patchak in the case, told Law360.

"You can imagine all kinds of situations
where interest groups or individuals who
have particular disputes going on will go to
Congress, and Congress could tell the courts
to say, 'Alright, suit dismissed, no
jurisdiction,'" he said.

While federal laws intended to stop ongoing
litigation haven't been that common
historically, a Supreme Court affirmation of
the Gun Lake Act might mean they "get a lot
less rare in a hurry," according to University
of Texas School of Law professor Stephen I.
Vladeck, who worked on an amicus brief in

"If you have the resources to do that, I think
people will increasingly take that tack,"
Rothfeld said.
Native American tribes will also be watching
the case closely, partly out of concern that the
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Supreme Court could raise questions around
Congress' plenary power with respect to
tribes, according to Native American Rights
Fund senior staff attorney Richard Guest.
While the Patchak ruling should focus purely
on the separation of powers question, "I don't
think we want to get into the scope of the
authority of Congress to act to the benefit of
Indian tribes," Guest said. "I think we're in
dangerous territory if we're opening up this
case for the justices to opine on that."
And a ruling against the Gun Lake Tribe
would allow Patchak to press his underlying
claims that the DOI's acquisition of trust land
for the tribe's casino is in conflict with the
Supreme Court's 2009 Carcieri v. Salazar
decision, Guest added.
"That's the issue that the tribes are extremely
interested in seeing resolved favorably," he
said.
Patchak is represented by Scott E. Gant of
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP.
The government is represented by Jeffrey B.
Wall, Jeffrey H. Wood, William B. Lazarus,
E. Ann Peterson and Lane N. McFadden of
the U.S. Department of Justice.
The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band is
represented by Conly J. Schulte and Nicole
E. Ducheneaux of Fredericks Peebles &
Morgan LLP.
The case is Patchak v. Zinke et al., case
number 16-498, in the Supreme Court of the
United States.
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“Law Blocking Tribal Casino Fight Constitutional, DC Circ. Says”
Law360
Andrew Westney
July 15, 2016

The D.C. Circuit on Friday upheld the
dismissal of a Michigan man's challenge to a
tribe's casino project on neighboring land,
ruling that a federal law specifically passed to
prevent a federal court from hearing the case
is constitutional.

Bradley Property, it must promptly be
dismissed,” the panel said. “Mr. Patchak’s
suit is just such an action.”
And since Congress had the power to change
the laws applicable to the case, Patchak
wasn’t deprived of his due process rights in
pursuing claims that the casino would
negatively alter the rural character around its
location, including his own property, the
panel said.

A unanimous circuit court panel ruled that the
Gun Lake Act — •signed into law in 2014 to
remove a district court’s jurisdictional
authority over David Patchak’s then-pending
case and affirm the U.S. Department of the
Interior’s decision to a parcel of land known
as the Bradley Property into trust for the
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish
Band
of
Pottawatomi Indians’ Gun Lake Casino —
didn’t violate his right to petition in court or
his due process rights.

“Even assuming that there may be a property
right to pursue a cause of action, in a
challenge to legislation affecting that very
suit, the legislative process provides all the
process that is due,” according to the opinion.
The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band
selected almost 150 acres in western
Michigan to be purchased and placed into a
trust by the DOI in accordance with the
Indian Reorganization Act, and proceeded to
build the Gun Lake Casino, following federal
recognition of the tribe in 1998.

Writing for a three-judge panel, Circuit Judge
Robert L. Wilkins said that the U.S. Supreme
Court’s April ruling in Bank Markazi v.
Peterson and other high court decisions
backed Congress’ authority to set a new
standard to apply to pending litigation
without directly amending the substantive
laws upon which the suit is based.

Patchak, who lives near the casino, sued thenSecretary of the Interior Ken Salazar in 2008
under the Administrative Procedure Act on
the grounds that because the tribe was
allegedly unrecognized at the time Congress

The section of the Gun Lake Act taking
jurisdiction away from the federal court
“provides a new legal standard we are
obliged to apply: If an action relates to the
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passed the IRA in 1934, the land acquisition
was unlawful.

contends that effort would be futile, the panel
said.

President Barack Obama signed the Gun
Lake Act into law in 2014. Among its
provisions, the statute affirms the agency’s
decision to take the tribal land into IRA trust
and strips potential claimants of the ability to
challenge that decision in federal court.

In order to show a violation of due process
rights, Patchak would have had to show he
was deprived of a protected interest and then
the court would have to assess whether he got
the process he was due, according to the
opinion. While Patchak could potentially
claim a property interest, he wasn’t owed a
court hearing after Congress passed the Gun
Lake Act, the panel said.

At oral arguments in May, the federal
government told the court that the Supreme
Court’s
Bank
Markazi
ruling
on
compensation for victims of Iraniansponsored terrorism bolstered its argument
that the Gun Lake Act isn’t unconstitutional.

And the law isn’t a bill of attainder that
impermissibly targets an individual through
legislation without the protection of a trial
because it isn’t punitive, the panel said.

The government argued that the decision,
which held that families of the victims of the
1983 Beirut Marine Corps barracks bombing
should be allowed to collect a $1.75 billion
award against Iran’s central bank, supported
the principle that Congress may retroactively
change a law applicable to pending litigation.

In a footnote, the panel said that Patchak’s
claims relied heavily on how the Supreme
Court interpreted the IRA in its 2009 decision
in Carcieri v. Salazar, but that the court didn’t
need to reach the merits of those claims.
Sharon Y. Eubanks of Bordas & Bordas
PLLC, who represents Patchak, said in a
statement Friday that her client is
disappointed in the ruling but "this already
long battle is anything but over."

The D.C. Circuit panel said the Bank Markazi
decision, like Patchak’s suit, applied new
legislation to pending litigation without
directly modifying the statute the suit was
based on. The Gun Lake Act didn’t directly
amend or modify the Administrative
Procedures Act or the Indian Reorganization
Act, under which Patchak brought his claims,
but still “amended the substantive law” that
applied to the suit, the panel said.

Patchak is weighing whether to petition the
U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case, and
"another fee to trust acquisition on adjacent
property may allow Mr. Patchak to finally
have a court look at the issue of whether the
tribe is even authorized to acquire land for a
casino, based on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Carcieri," Eubanks said in the
statement.

The law didn’t violate Patchak’s First
Amendment right to petition because
Congress is allowed to deprive lower federal
courts of jurisdiction as it sees fit, and
Patchak still has the ability to petition the
government administratively even if he

Representatives for the other parties were not
immediately available for comment Friday.
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Patchak is represented by Sharon Y. Eubanks
of Bordas & Bordas PLLC.
The government is represented by Lane N.
McFadden and John C. Cruden of the U.S.
Department of Justice, and James V.
DeBergh of the U.S. Department of the
Interior.
The Gun Lake Tribe is represented by Conly
J. Schulte and Nicole E. Ducheneaux of
Fredericks Peebles & Morgan LLP.
The case is Patchak v. Jewell et al., case
number 15-5200, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
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